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  • Influence
Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion
This paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in rivals. When firms are identical, only multilateral partial cross ownership (PCO) facilitatesExpand
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What to maximize if you must
TLDR
We show that in almost every game, for almost every distortion of a player's actual payoffs, some extent of this distortion is beneficial to the player because of the resulting effect on opponents' play. Expand
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Auctions with costly information acquisition
We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids inExpand
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The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences
This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limitingExpand
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Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure
We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he isExpand
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Pre-grant patent publication and cumulative innovation
We examine the implications of pre-grant publication (PP) of patent applications in the context of a cumulative innovation model. We show that PP leads to fewer applications and fewer inventions, butExpand
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Consumers' activism: the cottage cheese boycott
We study a consumer boycott on cottage cheese that was organized in Israel on Facebook in the summer of 2011 following a steep increase in prices after price controls were lifted in 2006. The boycottExpand
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Optimal search auctions
TLDR
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. Expand
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Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion
We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partialExpand
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Optimal State-Contingent Regulation Under Limited Liability
We consider an optimal regulation model in which the regulated firm’s production cost is subject to random, publicly observable shocks. The distribution of these shocks is correlated with the firm’sExpand
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