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Wireless sensor networks promise a new paradigm for gathering data via collaboration among sensors spreading over a large geometrical region. Many real-time applications impose stringent delay requirements and ask for time-efficient schedules of data aggregations in which sensed data at sensors are combined at intermediate sensors along the way towards the(More)
Locating source of diffusion in networks is crucial for controlling and preventing epidemic risks. It has been studied under various probabilistic models. In this paper, we study source location from a deterministic point of view by modeling it as the minimum weighted doubly resolving set (DRS) problem, which is a strengthening of the well-known metric(More)
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Given a preference system (G, ≺) and an integral weight function defined on the edge set of G (not necessarily bipartite), the maximum-weight stable matching problem is to find a stable matching of (G, ≺) with maximum total weight. We study this N P-hard problem using linear programming and polyhedral approaches, and show that the Rothblum system for(More)
Braess’s paradox exposes a counterintuitive phenomenon that when travelers selfishly choose their routes in a network, removing links can improve the overall network performance. Under the model of nonatomic selfish routing, we characterize the topologies of k-commodity undirected and directed networks in which Braess’s paradox never occurs. Our results(More)
Fashion, as a “second nature” of human being, has great economic impacts. In this paper, we apply a heterogenous network game to analyze the existence of a fashion cycle. There are two types of agents in the network game, conformists and rebels. Conformists prefer to match the action taken by the majority of her neighbors while rebels like to mismatch. Our(More)
This paper concerns the mechanism design for online scheduling in a strategic setting. In this setting, each job is owned by a self-interested agent who may misreport the release time, deadline, length, and value of her job, while we need to determine not only the schedule of the jobs, but also the payment of each agent. We focus on the design of incentive(More)