We consider a problem of finding optimal contracts in continuous time, when the agentâ€™s actions are unobservable by the principal, who pays the agent with a one-time payoff at the end of theâ€¦ (More)

We present a unified approach to solving contracting problems with full information in models driven by Brownian motion. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary and sufficientâ€¦ (More)

T paper studies the optimal contract between risk-neutral shareholders and a constant relative risk-aversion manager in a continuous-time model. Several interesting results are obtained. First, theâ€¦ (More)

We consider the problem of optimal contracts in continuous time, when the agentâ€™s actions are unobservable by the principal. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary conditions forâ€¦ (More)

In this paper we present a unified approach to solving principal-agent problems with full information in models driven by Brownian Motion. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessaryâ€¦ (More)

We present an equilibrium model of a moral-hazard economy with one firm and financial markets, where a stock and bonds are traded. We show that it is optimal for the principal to forbid the agent toâ€¦ (More)

We analyze a novel principal-agent problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in continuous time. The constant private shock revealed at time zero when the agent selects the contract has aâ€¦ (More)

In this paper we present a unified approach to solving principal-agent problems in models driven by Brownian Motion. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary and sufficientâ€¦ (More)

We present an equilibrium model of a moral-hazard economy with a very large firm and financial markets, where a stock and bonds are traded. We show that optimal contracts necessitate the principal toâ€¦ (More)

We consider the problem of when to deliver the contract payoff, in a continuous-time principalagent setting, in which the agentâ€™s effort is unobservable. The principal can design contracts of aâ€¦ (More)