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These working papers present preliminary research findings, and you are advised to cite with caution unless you first contact the author regarding possible amendments. We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of restructured electricity markets, with loca-tional marginal prices. Each player in this game faces a bilevel optimization problem(More)
Firms compete in supply functions when they offer a schedule of prices and quantities into a market; for example, this occurs in many wholesale electricity markets. We study the equilibrium behaviour when firms differ, both with regard to their costs and their capacities. We characterize the types of equilibrium solution that can occur. If the demand can be(More)
This paper uses a bilevel game to model markets for delivery of electrical power on looped transmission networks. It analyzes the effectiveness of an independent system operator (ISO) when generators (and, in some cases, retailers) with market power bid a single parameter of their linear supply (demand) functions to the ISO. The ISO, taking these bids at(More)
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