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- Xinmin Hu, Daniel Ralph
- Operations Research
- 2007

We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of restructured electricity markets, with locational marginal prices. Each player in this game faces a bilevel optimization problem that we model as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. The corresponding game is an example of an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints,… (More)

- Xinmin Hu, Daniel Ralph
- Math. Program.
- 2002

Using standard nonlinear programming (NLP) theory, we establish formulas for first and second order directional derivatives for optimal value functions of parametric mathematical programs with complementarity constraints (MPCCs). The main point is that under a linear independence condition on the active constraint gradients, optimal value sensitivity of… (More)

- Edward J. Anderson, Xinmin Hu
- Operations Research
- 2008

Firms compete in supply functions when they offer a schedule of prices and quantities into a market; for example, this occurs in many wholesale electricity markets. We study the equilibrium behaviour when firms differ, both with regard to their costs and their capacities. We characterize the types of equilibrium solution that can occur. If the demand can be… (More)

- Xinmin Hu, Daniel Ralph, +4 authors Michael C Ferris
- 2004

This paper uses a bilevel game to model markets for delivery of electrical power on looped transmission networks. It analyzes the effectiveness of an independent system operator (ISO) when generators (and, in some cases, retailers) with market power bid a single parameter of their linear supply (demand) functions to the ISO. The ISO, taking these bids at… (More)

Generators in a wholesale electricity market can exercise market power, but the existence of forward hedging contracts between consumers and generators mitigates this market power. A question arises as to why generators are willing to enter contracts with consumers to surrender their market power. In this paper, we model the role of the consumers (retailers… (More)

- Edward J. Anderson, Xinmin Hu
- J. Optimization Theory and Applications
- 2012

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