• Publications
  • Influence
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists anExpand
  • 121
  • 11
Optimal Voting Rules
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, andExpand
  • 84
  • 10
Market Segmentation: The Role of Opaque Travel Agencies
This paper investigates the role of discount travel agencies such as Priceline and Hotwire in the market segmentation of the hotel and airline industries. These agencies conceal importantExpand
  • 78
  • 9
Contests for Status
We study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents in a contest care about their relative position. A principal determines the number and size of status categories in orderExpand
  • 270
  • 9
Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquireExpand
  • 30
  • 7
Discriminatory Information Disclosure
We consider a price discrimination problem in which a seller has a single object for sale to a potential buyer. At the time of contracting, the buyer's private type is his incomplete privateExpand
  • 66
  • 5
Auctions with Limited Commitment
We study the role of limited commitment in a standard auction environment. In each period, the seller can commit to an auction with a reserve price but not to future reserve prices. We characterizeExpand
  • 22
  • 3
Optimal auctions with information acquisition
Article history: Received 6 January 2010 Available online xxxx JEL classification: C70 D44 D82 D86
  • 24
  • 3
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimalExpand
  • 64
  • 2
Specialization and partisanship in committee search
A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue costly search. Each alternative is described by a vector of distinct attributes, and each committee memberExpand
  • 41
  • 2