Xavier Martinez-Giralt

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We address the fundamental question arising in geographical economics: why do economic activities agglomerate in a small number of places? The main reasons for the formation of economic clusters involving firms and/or households are analyzed: (i) externalities under perfect competition; (ii) increasing returns under monopolistic competition; and (iii)(More)
In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for this is the increase in the bargaining position(More)
We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework synergies are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more efficiency and may even lead to efficiency losses. These mergers lead(More)
We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Two different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers. The second mechanism is the so-called " any willing provider " where the(More)
Large scientific facilities in all domains of science, are looking at cooperation between science and the industry to alleviate their increasing financial constraints, as proprietary research proposals are charged a price for the time-use of the facility. We argue that present practices to determine those prices are completely ad hoc and thus, not based in(More)