Xavier Martinez-Giralt

Learn More
In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for this is the increase in the bargaining position(More)
Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the (fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks(More)
We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Two different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the thirdparty payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers. The second mechanism is the so-called “any willing provider” where the(More)
Large scientific facilities in all domains of science, are looking at cooperation between science and the industry to alleviate their increasing financial constraints, as proprietary research proposals are charged a price for the time-use of the facility. We argue that present practices to determine those prices are completely ad hoc and thus, not based in(More)