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The theory-based model of categorization posits that concepts are represented as theories, not feature lists. Thus, it is interesting that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) established atheoretical guidelines for mental disorder diagnosis. Five experiments investigated how(More)
The current experiments examine mental health clinicians' beliefs about biological, psychological , and environmental bases of the DSM-IV-TR mental disorders and the consequences of those causal beliefs for judging treatment effectiveness. Study 1 found a large negative correlation between clinicians' beliefs about biological bases and environmental ⁄(More)
Mental disorders are increasingly understood in terms of biological mechanisms. We examined how such biological explanations of patients' symptoms would affect mental health clinicians' empathy--a crucial component of the relationship between treatment-providers and patients--as well as their clinical judgments and recommendations. In a series of studies,(More)
Do people believe mental disorders are real and possess underlying essences? The current study found that both novices and practicing clinicians held weaker essentialist beliefs about mental disorders than about medical disorders. They were also unwilling to endorse the idea that mental disorders are real and natural. Furthermore, compared with novices,(More)
When a cause interacts with unobserved factors to produce an effect, the contingency between the observed cause and effect cannot be taken at face value to infer causality. Yet it would be computationally intractable to consider all possible unobserved, interacting factors. Nonetheless, 6 experiments found that people can learn about an unobserved cause(More)
Practicing clinicians frequently think about behaviors both abstractly (i.e., in terms of symptoms, as in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed., DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and concretely (i.e., in terms of individual clients, as in DSM-5 Clinical Cases; Barnhill, 2013). Does abstract/concrete framing(More)
Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be(More)
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