#### Filter Results:

- Full text PDF available (22)

#### Publication Year

2010

2017

- This year (8)
- Last 5 years (20)
- Last 10 years (22)

#### Publication Type

#### Co-author

#### Journals and Conferences

#### Key Phrases

Learn More

- Warut Suksompong
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2016

Fair division has long been an important problem in the economics literature. In this note, we consider the existence of proportionally fair allocations of indivisible goods, i.e., allocations of indivisible goods in which every agent gets at least her proportionally fair share according to her own utility function. We show that when utilities are additive… (More)

A single-elimination (SE) tournament is a popular way to select a winner in both sports competitions and in elections. A natural and well-studied question is the tournament fixing problem (TFP): given the set of all pairwise match outcomes, can a tournament organizer rig an SE tournament by adjusting the initial seeding so that their favorite player wins?… (More)

- Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
- IJCAI
- 2017

We study the problem of finding a small subset of items that is agreeable to all agents, meaning that all agents value the subset at least as much as its complement. Previous work has shown worst-case bounds, over all instances with a given number of agents and items, on the number of items that may need to be included in such a subset. Our goal in this… (More)

- Warut Suksompong
- IJCAI
- 2016

We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen subset is agreeable to all players, i.e., every player weakly prefers the chosen subset to any subset of its complement. For… (More)

- Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Warut Suksompong
- ArXiv
- 2015

One of the most celebrated results in microeconomic theory is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), which states that every strategyproof and Pareto-optimal social choice function is a dictatorship. However, the theorem crucially relies on the assumption that outcomes are deterministic. Gibbard (1977) later considered… (More)

- Warut Suksompong
- 2014

Blumofe and Leiserson [6] gave the first provably good work-stealing work scheduler for multithreaded computations with dependencies. Their scheduler executes a fully strict (i.e., wellstructured) computation on P processors in expected time T1/P + O(T∞), where T1 denotes the minimum serial execution time of the multithreaded computation, and T∞ denotes the… (More)

- Warut Suksompong
- ArXiv
- 2017

We investigate the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among interested agents using the concept of maximin share. Procaccia and Wang showed that while an allocation that gives every agent at least her maximin share does not necessarily exist, one that gives every agent at least 2/3 of her share always does. In this paper, we consider the more… (More)

A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We provide several structural insights that improve our understanding of stable choice functions. In particular, (i) we show that every stable choice function is generated by a unique… (More)

- Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2017

The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in each interested party. While all players in a party share the same set of resources, each player has her own preferences.… (More)

- Warut Suksompong
- SAGT
- 2017

In this paper, we study the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible items with the extra feature that the items lie on a line. Our goal is to find a fair allocation that is contiguous, meaning that the bundle of each agent forms a contiguous block on the line. While allocations satisfying the classical fairness notions of proportionality,… (More)