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Fairly Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Items
TLDR
This paper shows the existence of contiguous allocations satisfying approximate versions of the classical fairness notions of proportionality, envy-freeness, and equitability that do not degrade as the number of agents or items increases. Expand
Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups
TLDR
This paper investigates envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in each interested party and shows that a simple truthful mechanism, namely the random assignment mechanism, yields an allocation that satisfies the weaker notion of approximate envy-freeness with high probability. Expand
The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods
TLDR
This paper investigates the efficiency of fair allocations of indivisible goods using the well-studied price of fairness concept, and provides tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss for allocations satisfying notions with guaranteed existence, including envy-freeness up to one good, balancedness, maximum Nash welfare, and leximin. Expand
Schelling Games on Graphs
TLDR
This work investigates the existence of equilibria in strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation, study the complexity of finding an equilibrium outcome or an outcome with high social welfare, and also provides upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy and stability. Expand
Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
TLDR
This work presents protocols for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations, which approximate both envy-freeness and maximin-share fairness. Expand
Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation
TLDR
A new model where the agents are not partitioned into groups in advance, but instead the partition can be chosen in conjunction with the allocation of the goods and it is shown that for agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, there is always a partition of the agents into two groups of any given sizes. Expand
Fairly Allocating Many Goods with Few Queries
TLDR
It is proved that computing an allocation satisfying envy-freeness and another of its relaxations, envy- freeness up to any good (EFX), requires a linear number of queries even when there are only two agents with identical additive valuations. Expand
Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
TLDR
It is proved new sufficient conditions on the pairwise match outcome information and the favorite player, under which there is guaranteed to be a seeding where the player wins the tournament. Expand
Scheduling asynchronous round-robin tournaments
TLDR
This work considers three measures of a schedule that concern the quality and fairness of a tournament and proposes a different schedule that performs optimally with respect to all measures when the number of teams is odd. Expand
On the structure of stable tournament solutions
TLDR
It is proved that every stable choice function is generated by a unique simple choice function, which never excludes more than one alternative, and which simple choice functions give rise to stable choice functions, and a strong relationship between stability and a new property of tournament solutions called local reversal symmetry is proved. Expand
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