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A single-elimination (SE) tournament is a popular way to select a winner in both sports competitions and in elections. A natural and well-studied question is the tournament fixing problem (TFP): given the set of all pairwise match outcomes, can a tournament organizer rig an SE tournament by adjusting the initial seeding so that their favorite player wins?… (More)

- Charles E. Leiserson, Tao B. Schardl, Warut Suksompong
- Theory of Computing Systems
- 2015

Inspired by applications in parallel computing, we analyze the setting of work stealing in multithreaded computations. We obtain tight upper bounds on the number of steals when the computation can be modeled by rooted trees. In particular, we show that if the computation with n processors starts with one processor having a complete k-ary tree of height h… (More)

- Warut Suksompong
- IJCAI
- 2016

We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen subset is agreeable to all players, i.e., every player weakly prefers the chosen subset to any subset of its complement. For… (More)

- Warut Suksompong
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2016

Fair division has long been an important problem in the economics literature. In this note, we consider the existence of proportionally fair allocations of indivisible goods, i.e., allocations of indivisible goods in which every agent gets at least her proportionally fair share according to her own utility function. We show that when utilities are additive… (More)

- Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
- ArXiv
- 2017

We study the problem of finding a small subset of items that is agreeable to all agents, meaning that all agents value the subset at least as much as its complement. Previous work has shown worst-case bounds, over all instances with a given number of agents and items, on the number of items that may need to be included in such a subset. Our goal in this… (More)

- Warut Suksompong, Charles E. Leiserson, Tao B. Schardl
- Inf. Process. Lett.
- 2016

This paper investigates a variant of the work-stealing algorithm that we call the localized work-stealing algorithm. The intuition behind this variant is that because of locality, processors can benefit from working on their own work. Consequently, when a processor is free, it makes a steal attempt to get back its own work. We call this type of steal a… (More)

- Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
- ArXiv
- 2017

The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in each interested party. While all players in a party share the same set of resources, each player has her own preferences.… (More)

- Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
- ArXiv
- 2017

Social goods are goods that grant value not only to their owners but also to the owners’ surroundings, be it their families, friends or office mates. The benefit a non-owner derives from the good is affected by many factors, including the type of the good, its availability, and the social status of the non-owner. Depending on the magnitude of the benefit… (More)

- Warut Suksompong
- ArXiv
- 2017

We investigate the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among interested agents using the concept of maximin share. Procaccia and Wang showed that while an allocation that gives every agent at least her maximin share does not necessarily exist, one that gives every agent at least 2/3 of her share always does. In this paper, we consider the more… (More)