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Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market.Expand
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The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games
We present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of G. Bolton and Zwick in which the “fair offer” can be slightly unfair. Expand
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Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets
Abstract In this note we show that the profitability of merger in markets with quantity competition does not only depend on cost conditions but also on the market structure and on the involved firms’Expand
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Allais for all: Revisiting the paradox in a large representative sample
We administer the Allais paradox questions to both a representative sample of the Dutch population and to student subjects. Three treatments are implemented: one with the original high hypotheticalExpand
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Workaholics and Dropouts in Organizations
This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test the theory of the optimal composition of prizes in contests. In the aggregate the behavior of subjects is consistent with that predictedExpand
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Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
The mere potential for one player to burn money prior to play has been shown in theory to be an effective device to select this player’s most preferred outcome, e.g., in the battle-of-the-sexes game [J. Econ. Theory 48 (1989) 476, J. Theory 57 (1992) 36]. Expand
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Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managersExpand
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To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets
We experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Expand
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Job Market Signaling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison
We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two toExpand
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The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory
We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi's bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. StandardExpand
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