Vyacheslav Fos

Learn More
We document a drastic reduction in hedge fund stock ownership during the recent financial crisis. In the two quarters around the Lehman collapse (2008Q3-Q4), hedge funds cut their equity holdings by about 29% and nearly every fourth fund dumped more than 40% of its equity portfolio in each quarter. We directly establish that investor redemptions were a(More)
Passive institutional investors are an increasingly important component of U.S. stock ownership, and their influence on firm-level governance is widely debated. To examine whether and by which mechanisms passive investors influence firms’ governance structures, we use an instrumental variable estimation and exploit variation in passive institutional(More)
Using a comprehensive sample of trades by Schedule 13D filers, who possess valuable private information when they accumulate stocks of targeted companies, this paper studies whether several liquidity measures reveal the presence of informed trading. The evidence suggests that when Schedule 13D filers trade aggressively, both highfrequency and low-frequency(More)
This paper presents a comprehensive predictive model of mortgage delinquency using a unique dataset from a major national mortgage bank containing all of its loan origination information from 2004 to 2008. Our analysis highlights two major agency problems underlying the mortgage crisis: an agency problem between the bank and mortgage brokers that results in(More)
T paper formally analyzes the biases related to self-reporting in hedge fund databases by matching the quarterly equity holdings of a complete list of 13F-filing hedge fund companies to the union of five major commercial databases of self-reporting hedge funds between 1980 and 2008. We find that funds initiate selfreporting after positive abnormal returns(More)
This paper studies the effect of potential proxy contests on corporate policies. I find that when the likelihood of a proxy contest increases, companies exhibit increases in leverage, dividends, and CEO turnover. In addition, companies decrease R&D, capital expenditures, stock repurchases, and executive compensation. Following these changes, there is an(More)
Using a hand-collected sample of election nominations for more than 30,000 directors over the period 2001–2010, we construct a novel measure of director proximity to elections: Years-to-election. We find that the closer directors of a board are to their next elections, the higher CEO turnover–performance sensitivity is. A series of tests—including one that(More)
  • ADAIR MORSE, Daniel Bergstresser, +8 authors Ana Paula Testolini
  • 2013
I investigate whether large, active investors exert influence over the portfolio decisions made by private equity (PE) fund managers to the detriment, or benefit, of smaller investors in the pool. Using a sample of 234 PE funds in which sovereign funds have invested, I document that 3.7 percent of portfolio companies have prior linkages to these active(More)
When a proxy contest is looming, the rate at which CEOs exercise options in order to sell (hold) the resulting shares slows down by 80% (accelerates by 60%), consistent with their desire to maintain or strengthen voting rights when facing control challenges. Such deviations are closely aligned with features unique to proxy contests such as the record dates(More)
This paper studies the holdings by institutional investors that are filed with a significant delay through amendments to Form 13F and that are not included in the standard 13F holdings databases (the “confidential holdings”). We find that asset management firms (hedge funds and investment companies/advisors) in general, and institutions that actively manage(More)