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Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
TLDR
In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. Expand
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
TLDR
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Expand
AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents
TLDR
We present AWESOME, the first multiagent learning algorithm that is guaranteed to have both of the properties in games with arbitrary numbers of actions and players. Expand
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria
TLDR
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. Expand
Complexity of Mechanism Design
TLDR
We propose an approach where a mechanism is automatically created for the preference aggregation setting at hand. Expand
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders
TLDR
We prove that for Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, and ranked pairs, the necessary winner problem is coNP-complete; also, we give a sufficient condition on scoring rules for the possible winner problem to be NP-complete (Borda satisfies this condition). Expand
Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winningExpand
Communication complexity of common voting rules
TLDR
We determine the communication complexity of the common voting rules. Expand
Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings
TLDR
Kemeny rankings are NP-hard to compute, but we extend on this work by providing various improved bounding techniques. Expand
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
TLDR
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Expand
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