Vilen Lipatov

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Hebous, Shafik, and Lipatov, Vilen—A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides(More)
This paper analyzes the effect of injunctions on royalty negotiations for standard essential patents. We develop a model in which courts grant injunctions only when they have sufficient evidence that the prospective licensee is unwilling, in line with the way we understand Courts to operate in Europe. In such a framework the prospective licensee has a(More)
Economists agree that accounting specialists are helpful in avoiding taxes. We argue that such help can often be called sophisticated evasion. We analyze it in a game of incomplete information played by tax authority, corporate taxpayers and accounting specialist. When sophisticated evasion is very common, marginal changes in enforcement are not e¤ective,(More)
We consider corporate tax evasion when business partners have di¤erent attitudes towards aggressive tax accounting. There are costs of uncoordinated tax reports, both in terms of catching inspectors’ attention and running accounts. If these costs are small, there exist a unique stable Nash equilibrium of the game between the tax authority and a population(More)
409 Perm krai is at the northern limit of the natural range of honeybees. Apis mellifera mellifera L. honeyy bees in its territory successfully overwinter and show high productivity. The Kama population of A. m. mell lifera inhabiting Perm krai (Shurakov, Petukhov, and Es'kov, 1999) is distinguished by morphological and ecophysiological characters from(More)
We consider corporate tax evasion as a decision a¤ecting business partners. There are costs of uncoordinated tax reports, both in terms of catching inspectors’attention and running accounts. If these costs are small, there exist a unique Nash equilibrium of the game between the tax authority and a population of heterogenous …rms. In this equilibrium, the(More)
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