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Truthy psychologism about evidence
What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychologicalExpand
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Clearing space for extreme psychologism about reasons
Are reasons for action facts or psychological states? There are two answers in the literature on the ontology of reasons. According to the Standard Story, normative reasons are facts, whileExpand
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A Non-modal Conception of Secondary Properties '
There seems to be a distinction bet:ween primary and secondary properties; some philosophers defend the view rhat properties like colours and values are secondary, while others criticize ie TheExpand
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Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work
Abstract Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because theyExpand
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Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency
What is going on when we explain someone’s belief by appeal to stereotypes associated with her gender, sexuality, race, or class? In this paper I try to motivate two claims. First, such explanationsExpand
Sound Epistemological Structure