Vasiliy Safin

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Altruistic behavior has been defined in economic terms as "…costly acts that confer economic benefits on other individuals" (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). In a prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation benefits the group but is costly to the individual (relative to defection), yet a significant number of players choose to cooperate. We propose that people do value(More)
People value rewards to others but discount those rewards based on social distance; rewards to a socially closer person are valued more than identical rewards to a socially more distant person (Jones and Rachlin, 2006). The concept of social discounting can explain cooperation and defection in two-player prisoner's dilemma (PD) games (Axelrod, 1980). The(More)
If a repeated gamble is subjectively structured into units each consisting of a string of consecutive losses followed by a single win, longer strings will necessarily be less valuable. Longer, less valuable strings will be discounted by delay more than will shorter, more valuable strings. This implies that the whole gamble's expected, delay-discounted value(More)
Altruism may be learned (behavioral evolution) in a way similar to that proposed in the target article for its biological evolution. Altruism (over social space) corresponds to self-control (over time). In both cases, one must learn to ignore the rewards to a particular (person or moment) and behave to maximize the rewards to a group (of people or moments).
Prior research has suggested that recipients of generosity behave more generously themselves (a direct social influence). In contrast, there is conflicting evidence about the existence of indirect influence (i.e., whether interacting with a recipient of generosity causes one to behave more generously), casting doubt on the possibility that altruistic(More)
Altruistic behavior benefits other individuals at a cost to oneself. The purpose of the present experiment was to study altruistic behavior by players (P) in 2-person iterated prisoner's dilemma games in which reciprocation by the other player (OP) was impossible, and this impossibility was clear to P. Altruism by P could not therefore be attributed to(More)
The amount effect of delay discounting (by which the value of larger reward amounts is discounted by delay at a lower rate than that of smaller amounts) strictly implies that value functions (value as a function of amount) are steeper at greater delays than they are at lesser delays. That is, the amount effect and the difference in value functions at(More)
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