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We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to smooth games defined by Roughgarden, that can be thought of as mechanisms that generate approximately market clearing prices. We show… (More)

We consider a general class of Bayesian Games where each players utility depends on his type (possibly multidimensional) and on the strategy profile and where players' types are distributed independently. We show that if their full information version for any fixed instance of the type profile is a smooth game then the Price of Anarchy bound implied by the… (More)

Typical models of strategic interactions in computer science use simultaneous move games. However, in applications simultaneity is often hard or impossible to achieve. In this paper, we study the robustness of the Nash Equilibrium when the assumption of simultaneity is dropped. In particular we propose studying the sequential price of anarchy: the quality… (More)

In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players. The goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative understanding of outcomes of such sequential auctions. In earlier work (Paes Leme et al. 2012) we initiated the study… (More)

We introduce a new hierarchy over monotone set functions, that we refer to as MPH (Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs). Levels of the hierarchy correspond to the degree of comple-mentarity in a given function. The highest level of the hierarchy, MPH-m (where m is the total number of items) captures all monotone functions. The lowest level, MPH-1, captures… (More)

We present an analysis framework for bounding the price of anarchy (POA) in games that have many players, as in many of the games most pertinent to computer science applications. We use this framework to demonstrate that, in many of the models in which the POA has been studied, the POA in large games is much smaller than the worst-case bound. Our framework… (More)

We study the design of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in single parameter domains, for the objective of optimizing social efficiency as measured by social cost. In the problems we consider, a group of participants compete to receive service from a mechanism that can provide such services at a cost. The mechanism wishes to choose which agents to… (More)

Myerson derived a simple and elegant solution to the single-parameter revenue-maximization problem in his seminal work on optimal auction design assuming the usual model of quasi-linear utilities. In this paper, we consider a slight generalization of this usual model—from linear to convex " perceived " payments. This more general problem does not appear to… (More)

In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing ex-ternalities. Motivated by this consideration, we study a setting of a market of buyers and sellers, where each seller holds one item,… (More)

The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption. Existing work in Economics on inferring agent values from data relies on the assumption that all participant strategies are best responses of the observed play of… (More)