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- Ivan Damgård, Valerio Pastro, Nigel P. Smart, Sarah Zakarias
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2011

We propose a general multiparty computation protocol secure against an active adversary corrupting up to n−1 of the n players. The protocol may be used to compute securely arithmetic circuits over any finite field Fpk . Our protocol consists of a preprocessing phase that is both independent of the function to be computed and of the inputs, and a much more… (More)

- Ivan Damgård, Marcel Keller, Enrique Larraia, Valerio Pastro, Peter Scholl, Nigel P. Smart
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2012

SPDZ (pronounced “Speedz”) is the nickname of the MPC protocol of Damgård et al. from Crypto 2012. SPDZ provided various efficiency innovations on both the theoretical and practical sides compared to previous work in the preprocessing model. In this paper we both resolve a number of open problems with SPDZ; and present several theoretical and practical… (More)

- Dario Fiore, Rosario Gennaro, Valerio Pastro
- ACM Conference on Computer and Communications…
- 2014

We study the task of verifiable delegation of computation on encrypted data. We improve previous definitions in order to tolerate adversaries that learn whether or not clients accept the result of a delegated computation. In this strong model, we construct a scheme for arbitrary computations and highly efficient schemes for delegation of various classes of… (More)

- Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damgård, Valerio Pastro
- ICITS
- 2011

We present a protocol that allows to prove in zero-knowledge that committed values xi, yi, zi, i = 1, . . . , l satisfy xiyi = zi, where the values are taken from a finite field. For error probability 2−u the size of the proof is linear in u and only logarithmic in l. Therefore, for any fixed error probability, the amortized complexity vanishes as we… (More)

- Allison Bishop, Valerio Pastro
- Public Key Cryptography
- 2014

We study robust secret sharing schemes in which between one third and one half of the players are corrupted. In this scenario, robust secret sharing is possible only with a share size larger than the secrets, and allowing a positive probability of reconstructing the wrong secret. In the standard model, it is known that at least m+k bits per share are needed… (More)

- Allison Bishop, Valerio Pastro, Rajmohan Rajaraman, Daniel Wichs
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2015

In a t-out-of-n robust secret sharing scheme, a secret message is shared among n parties who can reconstruct the message by combining their shares. An adversary can adaptively corrupt up to t of the parties, get their shares, and modify them arbitrarily. The scheme should satisfy privacy, meaning that the adversary cannot learn anything about the shared… (More)

- Rosario Gennaro, Valerio Pastro
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2014

- Morten Dahl, Valerio Pastro, Mathieu Poumeyrol
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2017

We propose a practical solution to performing simple cross-user machine learning on a sensitive dataset distributed among a set of users with privacy concerns. We focus on a scenario in which a single company wishes to obtain the distribution of aggregate features, while ensuring a high level of privacy for the users. We are interested in the case where… (More)

- Valerio Pastro, Dorthe Haagen Nielsen, Ellen Kjemtrup
- 2011

. In STOC, pages 699–710. ACM, 1992. [Gen09] Craig Gentry. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In Michael Mitzenmacher, editor, STOC, pages 169–178. ACM, 2009. [GHS12a] Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and Nigel P. Smart. Fully homomorphic encryption with polylog overhead. In David Pointcheval and Thomas Johansson, editors, EUROCRYPT, volume 7237… (More)

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