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Congressional Institutionalization: A Cross‐National Comparison

This article explains variations in levels of institutionalization across legislatures of the world. It construes institutionalization as an equilibrium outcome that emerges from beliefs and…
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Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems

This article analyzes the use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems. It suggests that the nature of executive-legislative bargaining is fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the…
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Checking Presidential Power

A central concern about the robustness of democratic rule in new democracies is the concentration of power in the executive branch and the potential this creates for abuse. This concern is felt…
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Do Transitional Justice Museums Persuade Visitors? Evidence from a Field Experiment

Do transitional justice museums persuade visitors? We implement a novel field experiment at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile, to understand the effects of governments’…
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Do Museums Promote Reconciliation? A Field Experiment on Transitional Justice

Can transitional justice museums promote reconciliation after political violence? Existing scholarship suggests that transitional justice policies aid processes of reconciliation and promote…

Item Vetoes and Attempts to Override Them in Multiparty Legislatures

This paper analyzes the dynamics of vetoes and veto overrides in the context of a multiparty legislature using an original dataset from the period 1983–2007 in Argentina. We argue that the President…
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! 1 ! Partial Veto Bargaining

This paper analyzes variations in legislative bargaining when the executive is endowed with the partial veto, as opposed to the package veto. Counter commonly held beliefs that the partial veto…

Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process: The Argentine Senate in Comparative Perspective by HirokazuKikuchi, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, xx + 295 pp.

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A Tale of Two Latin American Congresses. Towards a Comparative Study of Institutionalization and Effectiveness

This paper is concerned with the characteristics, determinants and consequences of varying levels of congressional institutionalization. Our work can be traced back to the early work on congressional…

Presidents on the Fast Track: Fighting Floor Amendments with Restrictive Rules

A formal model generates hypotheses and results confirm that preference overlap between the president and committee chairs drives the use of fast-track authority systematically, and claims that the key consequence of urgency authority is procedural: urgency prevents amendments during floor consideration.
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