Val E. Lambson

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In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per-firm output; and (ii) increasing industry price (and(More)
Although rational consumers without bequest motives are better o¤ investing exclusively with annuitized instruments in partial equilibrium, we show the welfare bene…ts of annuitization are ambiguous in general equilibrium. Extending the optimal irrational behavior framework of Feigenbaum, Caliendo, and Gahramanov (2008) to allow for uncertain lifetimes, we(More)
An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. Simple examples provide insights into: (1) the relationship between sunk costs and industry concentration, (2) entry when current profits are negative, and (3) the relationship between entry and the length of the product cycle. A subgame perfect(More)
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with continuous private signals. In equilibrium, some citizens ignore their private information and abstain from voting, in deference to those with higher-quality signals. Even as the number of highly-informed peers grows large, however, citizens with only moderate(More)
This paper sets out to test two interesting lines of recent development in oligopoly theory. The first, arising out of the analysis of infinitely repeated games, suggests conditions under which collusive outcomes can be supported as non-cooperative equilibria by appropriate threat strategies. The second considers the nature of equilibrium in a homogeneous(More)
We study an important recent series of buyback auctions conducted by the U.S. Treasury in retiring $67.5 billion of its illiquid off-the-run debt. The Treasury was successful in buying back large amounts of illiquid debt while suffering only a small market-impact cost. The Treasury included the most-illiquid bonds more frequently in the auctions, but tended(More)
This paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly model with localized competition. Private information about the rivals' past actions naturally arises from this product market structure. The resulting communication problems imply that firms should adopt strategies with sufficiently lenient punishments. Infinite grim punishments are too severe(More)
The aim of this paper is to explore the structure of cities as a function of labor di¤erentiation, gains to trade, a …xed cost for constructing the transportation network, a variable cost of commodity transport, and the commuting costs of consumers. Firms use di¤erent types of labor to produce di¤erent outputs. Locations of all agents are endogenous as are(More)
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [2008] attempt "[to identify] the broadest possible set of temptation-driven behavior." They argue that a desire for commitment characterizes such behavior. However, we argue that they go too far by including preferences which are not temptation-driven. We introduce two axioms which are stronger than their Desire for Commitment(More)