Val E. Lambson

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1 Abstract: An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history.(More)
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [2008] attempt "[to identify] the broadest possible set of temptation-driven behavior." They argue that a desire for commitment characterizes such behavior. However, we argue that they go too far by including preferences which are not temptation-driven. We introduce two axioms which are stronger than their Desire for Commitment(More)
This paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly model with localized competition. Private information about the rivals' past actions naturally arises from this product market structure. The resulting communication problems imply that firms should adopt strategies with sufficiently lenient punishments. Infinite grim punishments are too severe(More)
2 Abstract In this paper we examine the sex differences in the pay of school teachers in Missouri. In almost all Missouri school districts, pay is determined by reference to a salary schedule that maps the teaching experience and education level of an individual to a salary level. In spite of this apparently mechanical rule for determining pay, we find that(More)
In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per-firm output; and (ii) increasing industry price (and(More)
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