Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, V. Makarov
- Computer Science, Physics
- 26 August 2010
By using bright pulses of light to ‘blind’ the avalanche photodiode detectors used in quantum cryptography equipment, scientists in Europe have shown that it is possible to tracelessly steal the…
Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system.
- I. Gerhardt, Qin Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, V. Makarov
- Computer Science, MathematicsNature Communications
- 30 October 2010
It is shown that non-idealities in physical implementations of QKD can be fully practically exploitable, and must be given increased scrutiny if quantum cryptography is to become highly secure.
Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
- V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar
- Physics, Computer Science
- 3 November 2005
For the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol, it is shown that if the efficiency mismatch between 0 and 1 detectors for some value of the control parameter gets large enough, Eve can construct a successful faked-states attack causing a quantum bit error rate lower than 11%.
Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution.
- N. Jain, C. Wittmann, G. Leuchs
- Computer SciencePhysical Review Letters
- 11 March 2011
This work proposes and experimentally demonstrate a method to induce a large temporal detector efficiency mismatch in a commercial QKD system by deceiving a channel length calibration routine, and devise an optimal and realistic strategy using faked states to break the security of the cryptosystem.
Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography.
- A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov
- PhysicsPhysical Review Letters
- 31 October 2013
A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes, which can turn a perfect QKD system into a completely insecure system.
Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography.
- L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, V. Makarov
- PhysicsOptics Express
- 14 September 2010
It is demonstrated that the detectors in a commercial QKD system Clavis2 can be blinded by heating the avalanche photo diodes using bright illumination, so-called thermal blinding, and the detectors can be triggered using short bright pulses once they are blind.
Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light
- V. Makarov
- Physics
- 26 July 2007
Single photon detectors (SPDs) based on passively quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than 1 nW. A bright-light regime suitable for…
Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography
- L. Lydersen, N. Jain, G. Leuchs
- Physics
- 10 June 2011
We introduce the concept of a superlinear threshold detector, a detector that has a higher probability to detect multiple photons if it receives them simultaneously rather than at separate times.…
After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
- C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, G. Leuchs
- Physics, Computer Science
- 14 September 2010
A method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors that employs bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation time to allow for an intercept–resend attack.
Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination
- L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. Hamed Majedi, J. Skaar, V. Makarov
- Physics
- 13 June 2011
We experimentally demonstrate that a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector is deterministically controllable by bright illumination. We found that bright light can temporarily make a large…
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