Learn More
We analyze in...nitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring, and construct sequential equilibria where strategies are measurable with respect to players’ beliefs regarding their opponents’ continuation strategies. We show that, when monitoring is almost perfect, the symmetric e¢cient outcome can be approximated in any(More)
We analyze the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over equilibria—the battle-of-the-sexes or the hawk–dove game are key examples. If one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria, efficient equilibria must be egalitarian. For finitely repeated games, and generic discount factors, there is a unique(More)
A principal and an agent enter into a sequence of agreements. The principal faces an interim participation constraint at each date, but can commit to the current agreement; in contrast, the agent has the opportunity to renege on the current agreement. We study the time structure of agreement sequences that satisfy participation and no-deviation constraints(More)
Taylor's model of staggered contracts is an in uential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real e ects of nominal shocks. However, in standard imperfect competition models, if agents are allowed to choose the timing of pricing decisions, they will typically choose to synchronize. This paper provides a simple model of imperfect competition(More)
We study an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to play a symmetric coordination game. Opportunities to adjust strategy and location arrive asynchronously and infrequently, and cannot be coordinated. Our results on the short-run co-existence of different conventions and long-run efficiency depend upon a condition on off-equilibrium payoffs(More)
We examine the ratchet e¤ect in a situation where both principal and agent are uncertain about the di¢ culty of the job, and must learn this over time. Since the agent can always increase his future continuation value by shirking, this must be deterred by higher powered incentives today. However, with a continuum of e¤ort levels, high powered incentives(More)
We provide a theoretical foundation for the use of Markov strategies in repeated games with asynchronous moves. If admissible strategies must display finite (arbitrarily long) memory and each player incurs a “complexity cost” which depends on the memory length required by her strategy, then every Nash equilibrium must be in Markovian strategies. If, in(More)
We study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players. We assume that social memory is finite—every player, except possibly one, is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past. This class of games includes games between a long-run player and a sequence of(More)