• Publications
  • Influence
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones
We show that in the presence of admissions reserves, the effect of the precedence order (i.e., the order in which different types of seats are filled) is comparable to the effect of adjusting reserveExpand
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A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem
Abstract This paper characterizes the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem. Schools may have multiple available seats to be assigned to students. For each school a strictExpand
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The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments
TLDR
This paper introduces a new matching mechanism that is a hybrid of the two most common mechanisms in school choice, the Boston Mechanism (BM) and the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. Expand
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Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms
An important but under-explored issue in student assignment procedures is heterogeneity in the level of strategic sophistication among students. Our work provides the first direct measure of whichExpand
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Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchanges, in which export-import balances are required for longevity of programs. These exchangesExpand
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Competitive equilibria in school assignment
TLDR
We extend the definition of a competitive equilibrium to the school assignment problem and show that in every competitive equilibrium with weakly decreasing prices, the equilibrium assignment is unique and exactly corresponds to Top Trading Cycles assignment. Expand
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College Admissions with Complementarities
We study many-to-one matching with complementarities. Real life examples include college admissions with two-sided monetary transfers, teacher assignment with different teaching loads, workerExpand
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School choice under partial fairness
We generalize the school choice problem by defining a notion of allowable priority violations. In this setting, a weak axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority violations.Expand
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The modified Boston mechanism
  • Umut Dur
  • Computer Science
  • Math. Soc. Sci.
  • 1 September 2019
TLDR
We slightly modify the Boston mechanism and show that the modified version outperforms the original Boston mechanism in terms of strategy-proofness. Expand
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Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools
Affirmative action schemes must confront the tension between admitting the highest scoring applicants and ensuring diversity. In Chicago's affirmative action system for exam schools, applicants areExpand
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