The principal±agent problem between the regulator, regulated banks, and taxpayers is critical to the viability of the ®nancial systemÕs safety net. There exists the danger that the regulator will collude with regulated banks to pursue their bene®ts at the expense of taxpayers, thereby reducing eectiveness of ®nancial supervision. This paper proposes that… (More)
Free trade agreements (FTAs) have rules of origin (ROOs) to prevent tariff cir-cumvention by firms of non-member countries. This paper points out that in imperfectly competitive markets, ROOs have another role overlooked in the existing literature. Instead of focusing on the impacts of ROOs in the intermediate-good markets, we draw our attention to the… (More)
Intraplantar injection of capsaicin (1.6 microg/paw) into the mouse hindpaw produced an acute paw-licking/biting response. This study was designed (1) to investigate the antinociceptive effects of intraplantar administration of capsazepine, a competitive vanilloid receptor antagonist, and ruthenium red, a noncompetitive antagonist, in the nociceptive… (More)
Using a large sample of financially distressed small firms in Japan, we find that a distressed firm goes bankrupt faster if it uses proportionately more trade credits. Financially distressed firms experiencing a sharp decrease in trade payables are also more likely to go bankrupt. This suggests that coordination failure among a large number of dispersed… (More)
We introduce a small cost of leading in the two-player action commitment game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We investigate a price competition model and find that any randomized strategy equilibria converge to the Bertrand equilibrium.
We introduce product differentiation in the model of price competition with strictly convex costs in which firms have to supply all the forthcoming demand. We find that although a continuum of equilibria exists in a homogeneous product market, the competitive price equilibrium is the only robust one. Specifically, as long as the equilibrium correspondence… (More)
We introduce a small cost of leading (small gain from waiting) in the two-player action commitment game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We investigate a quantity competition model with linear demand and constant marginal costs. We find that there exists a unique randomized strategy equilibrium as long as the leading cost is positive and not too… (More)
A conventional wisdom in economics posits that more intense market competition, measured in almost any way, reduces firm profit. In this paper, we challenge this conventional wisdom in a simple Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein an efficient firm (dominant firm) competes against less efficient firms (fringe firms). We find that an increase… (More)