Torun Dewan

Learn More
This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist(More)
I consider a two-candidate election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate, where voting is costly, and where participants are instrumentally motivated. The unique equilibrium predicts substantial turnout under reasonable conditions, and greater turnout for the apparent underdog helps to offset the expected advantage(More)
We use structural estimates of time preferences to customize incentives for a sample of polio vaccinators during a series of door-to-door immunization drives in Pakistan. Our investigation proceeds in three stages. First, we measure time preferences using intertem-poral allocations of vaccinations. Second, we derive the mapping between these structural(More)
Using data form the UK we estimate the effects of ministerial resignation on government popularity. We test a counterfactual argument that resignations should have a 'corrective effect', an increase in popularity, when taking into account the effect on popularity of the resignation issue. We get empirical estimates by using the age of ministers involved in(More)
  • Marko Klašnja, Rocío Titiunik, Dan Bernhardt, Matías Cattaneo, Torun Dewan, Simon Hix +10 others
  • 2014
We study how representation works in a context where accountability to voters is restricted because of term limits and accountability to parties is limited because of party weakness. Analyzing all Brazilian mayoral elections since 1996 to the present using a regression discontinuity design, we show that becoming the incumbent party results in large(More)
  • Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Hannes Mueller, Stephen Ansolabehere, Fernando Aragon, Torun Dewan, Simon Hix +3 others
  • 2010
We present a formal model of intra-party politics to explain candidate selection within parties. We think of parties as heterogeneous groups of individuals who aim to implement a set of policies but who differ in their priorities. When party heterogeneity is too large, parties are in danger of splitting into smaller yet more homogeneous groups. In this(More)
I consider a two-candidate plurality-rule election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate, where voting is costly, and where participants are instrumentally motivated. The unique equilibrium predicts significant turnout under reasonable parameter configurations, and greater turnout for the underdog offsets the(More)
  • Torun Dewan, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Rubenson, Arjun Singh, Wendy Bergerud
  • 2009
Are leaders effective because of some innate qualities—for example, clarity , trustworthiness or focality—or because of the particular arguments they em-ploy? To analyze these effects systematically we need variation in both messages and leaders. Whilst these conditions are satisfied in many political settings, and in particular during political campaigns,(More)
In recent years some of the best theoretical work on the political economy of political institutions and processes has begun surfacing outside the political science mainstream in high quality economics journals. This two-part paper surveys these contributions from a recent five-year period. In Part I, the focus is on elections, voting and information(More)
  • Jim Snyder, Jordi Blanes I Vidal, Catherine De Vries, Alexander Fouirnaies, Simon Hix, Torun Dewan +4 others
  • 2013
Why do voters support corrupt politicians? One reason is that voters care about both corruption and partisan control of government; the more voters care about which party wins, the less they can deter individual wrongdoing. I highlight this tradeoff in the 2009 UK expenses scandal, showing that electoral accountability was less effective in constituencies(More)