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Cohesive government-versus-opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in Westminster democracies. Using new data from the modern Scottish Parliament, we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks. We look at differences in the way that parties operate in Westminster(More)
This paper provides a novel model of executives in Parliamentary democracies. We account for key features of these institutions: decision-making authority is assigned to individual ministers; the parliamentary majority provides support for this assignment; and the parliament debates policy. Supposing that politicians’ private information is relevant for all(More)
In recent years some of the best theoretical work on the political economy of political institutions and processes has begun surfacing outside the political science mainstream in high quality economics journals. This two-part paper surveys these contributions from a recent five-year period. In Part I, the focus is on elections, voting and information(More)
Can we predict when and where violence will break out within cases of genocide? Given often weak political will to respond, knowing where to strategically prioritize limited resources is valuable information for international decision makers contemplating intervention. I develop a theoretical model to help identify areas vulnerable to violence during(More)
This paper studies the impacts of party discipline on allocation of scarce federal resources among national districts. In particular, I model the distribution of government spending within a two-party legislature as an asymmetric contest game between congress members, in which the majority party has a relative advantage in directing pork barrel into its(More)
Are leaders effective because of some innate qualities—for example, clarity, trustworthiness or focality—or because of the particular arguments they employ? To analyze these effects systematically we need variation in both messages and leaders. Whilst these conditions are satisfied in many political settings, and in particular during political campaigns,(More)
In recent years some of the best theoretical work on the political economy of political institutions and processes has begun surfacing outside the political science mainstream in high quality economics journals. This two-part paper surveys these contributions from a recent five-year period. In Part I, the focus is on elections, voting and information(More)
The SAGE Library of Political Science collects together the articles that have been most influential in shaping the discipline. Each multi-volume set presents a collection of field-defining published works, both classical and contemporary, sourced from the foremost publications in the discipline by an internationally renowned editor or editorial team. They(More)
We offer an institutional explanation for the dramatic decline in corrupt practices that characterizes British political development in the mass suffrage era. Parliamentary candidates who faced corruption charges were judged by tribunals of sitting MPs until 1868, when this responsibility was passed to the courts. We draw on theory and empirical evidence to(More)