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Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player’s type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each… (More)

- Wen-Jui Kuo, Tomas Sjöström, Yu-Ping Chen, Yen-Hsiang Wang, Chen-Ying Huang
- Science
- 2009

Dual-process theories distinguish between intuition (fast and emotional) and reasoning (slow and controlled) as a basis for human decision-making. We contrast dominance-solvable games, which can be solved by step-by-step deliberative reasoning, with pure coordination games, which must be solved intuitively. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we… (More)

- Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, François Ortalo-Magné, Tomas Sjöström, Kevin Roberts
- 1997

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up’ problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a contractual solution to the… (More)

- Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto, +6 authors Ronald Stauber
- 2007

We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation succeed in all type spaces coherent with a given payoff type space as well as with a given space of first-order beliefs about the other agents’ payoff types. This last bit, which constitutes our reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine, allows us to obtain a… (More)

- Timothy N. Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Tomas Sjöström, Takehiko Yamato
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2006

† We thank anonymous referees and an associate editor for their useful comments. 2 ABSTRACT Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash… (More)

- Chen-Ying Huang, Tomas Sjöström
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2003

In order to calculate the worth of a coalition of players, the coalition needs to predict the actions of outsiders. We propose that, for a given solution concept, such predictions should be made by applying the solution concept to the “reduced society” consisting of the non-members. We illustrate by computing the r-core for the case of Bertrand competition… (More)

Many believe that a key innovation by the Grameen Bank is to encourage borrowers to help each other in hard times. To analyse this, we study a mechanism design problem where borrowers share information about each other, but their limited side contracting ability prevents them from writing complete insurance contracts. We derive a lending mechanism which… (More)

assume that third parties are not available. Given this assumption, the equilibrium outcome is not first-best efficient if contracts can be renegotiated. To be more specific, suppose an architect and a builder must cooperate to build a building. The quality of the building will depend on three things: the quality of the architect’s design, the builder’s… (More)

A principal must decide whether or not to implement a project that originated with one of her employees. Several employees have information about the quality of the project. A successfully implemented project raises the inventor’s chance of promotion, at his peer’s expense, but a failed project ruins the inventor’s career. An employee who has a relatively… (More)

- Vijay Krishna, Tomas Sjöström
- Math. Oper. Res.
- 1998

We study the continuous time Brown-Robinson ctitious play process for non-zero sum games. We show that, in general, ctitious play cannot converge cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players use more than two pure strategies.