Tom Hammond

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  • Jonathan Bendor, Stanford University, Walter, Elise Haas, Adam Meirowitz Is Assistant, Ami Glazer +11 others
  • 2004
A lthough a large literature on delegation exists, few models have pushed beyond a core set of canonical assumptions. This approach may be justified on grounds of tractability, but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation. Consequently, the(More)
  • Tom S Clark, Benjamin Lauderdale, Chris Achen, Chuck Cameron, Cliff Carrubba, Josh Clinton +11 others
  • 2009
This paper develops a scaling model to estimate U.S. Supreme Court opinion locations and justice ideal points along a common spatial dimension using data derived from the citations between opinions. Citations from new opinions to precedent opinions usually apply and endorse the doctrine of the precedent opinion; however, sometimes they implicitly or(More)
  • Michael M Ting, Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Carpenter, Joseph Cuffari, Sean Gailmard, Tom Hammond
  • 2003
and three anonymous referees for their particularly helpful comments and discussions. Abstract Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action(More)
Insufficient focused attention has been paid by the conservation community to conservation of biodiversity outside of protected areas. Biodiversity mainstreaming addresses this gap in global conservation practice by " embedding biodiversity considerations into policies, strategies and practices of key public and private actors that impact or rely on(More)
  • Daniel Carpenter, Michael M Ting, James Fearon, John Ferejohn, Tom Hammond, Lewis Kornhauser +4 others
  • 2005
How do the errors of regulators – approving bad products, or rejecting good ones – depend upon the submission strategies and characteristics of submitting private entities or firms? We develop a model of approval regulation in which both firm and regulator are uncertain about the underlying quality of a product, but where the firm is better informed than(More)
  • Chris Den Hartog, Nathan W Monroe, Scott Ainsworth, Neal Beck, Cheryl Boudreau, Sean Cain +44 others
  • 2004
On May 24, 2001, Senator James Jeffords announced he would switch from Republican to independent, and would vote with Democrats on organizational matters, making the Democrats the Senate majority party. This change in majority party control occurred without any simultaneous changes in Senate membership or preferences. We take advantage of this controlled(More)
  • Anthony M Bertelli, Sven E Feldmann, John Brehm, Richard Epstein, Morris Fiorina, Tom Hammond +4 others
  • 2003
Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an(More)
  • Anthony M Bertelli, Sven E Feldmann, Jon Bendor, John Brehm, Tom Hammond, George Krause
  • 2002
Studies of delegation and ex ante legislative control of the bureaucracy have explored ways in which legislatures use the scope of delegation embodied in legislation to control bureaucratic agencies. It is generally assumed that courts follow legislative design in enforcing the intended structure and substance of legislation, subject to potential(More)
  • Susan K Snyder, Barry R Weingast, Steve Ansolabehere, Kelly Chang, Rui De Figureiredo, Tom Hammond +8 others
  • 1999
Although economists and political scientists approach the politics of regulatory agency policymaking in different ways, nearly all agree that elected officials control regulatory agency policymaking for political ends. Elected officials negotiate the balance between citizen and interest group demand, translating this balance into pressure on the agency.(More)
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