Tobias Schuwerk

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The neurocognitive components of Theory of Mind reasoning remain poorly understood. In particular the role of the posterior medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of other's mental states such as beliefs that are incongruent with one's own knowledge of reality is not clear-cut. It is unknown whether this region is involved in computing discrepant mental(More)
Since false belief reasoning requires mental state representation independently of the state of reality, it is seen as a key ability in Theory of Mind (ToM). Although true beliefs do not have to be processed independently of the state of reality, growing behavioural evidence indicates that true belief reasoning is different from just reasoning about the(More)
This study aimed to investigate the relationship between explicit and implicit forms of Theory of Mind reasoning and to test the influence of experience on implicit Theory of Mind reasoning in individuals with autism spectrum disorders and in neurotypical adults. Results from two standard explicit Theory of Mind tasks are mixed: Individuals with autism(More)
Switching between one's own and another person's perspective is a cognitive component of Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning that is essential for successful social interaction. Computing another's divergent belief independently from one's own perspective poses a particular challenge. Neuroimaging has demonstrated the involvement of the posterior medial(More)
Cortical networks underpinning attentional control and mentalizing converge at the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). It is debated whether the rTPJ is fractionated in neighboring, but separate functional modules underpinning attentional control and mentalizing, or whether one overarching cognitive mechanism explains the rTPJ's role in both domains.(More)
The present study examined the contribution of efficiency reasoning and statistical learning on visual action anticipation in preschool children, adolescents, and adults. To this end, Experiment 1 assessed proactive eye movements of 5-year-old children, 15-year-old adolescents, and adults, who observed an agent stating the intent to reach a goal as quickly(More)
Implicit mentalizing, a fast, unconscious and rigid way of processing other's mental states has recently received much interest in typical social cognitive development in early childhood and in adults with autism spectrum condition (ASC). This research suggests that already infants implicitly mentalize, and that adults with ASC have a sustained implicit(More)
False belief reasoning is a key Theory of Mind (ToM) competence. By four years of age children understand that a person's behaviour can be based on a false belief about reality. Children cannot understand that a person's emotion can also be based on a false belief before the age of six. In order to generate hypothesis on basic processes distinguishing these(More)
Nonverbal communication using social cues, like gestures, governs a great part of our daily interactions. It has been proposed that people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show a deviant processing of social cues throughout their social cognitive development. However, social cues do not always convey an intention to communicate. Hence, the aim of this(More)
Mentalizing, the ability to attribute mental states to others and oneself, is a cognitive function with high relevance for social interactions. Recent neuroscientific research has increasingly contributed to attempts to decompose this complex social cognitive function into constituting neurocognitive building blocks. Additionally, clinical research that(More)
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