Tingding Chen

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Although the possibility of attacking elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) by power analysis repeatedly appears in research papers, there were few electromagnetic analysis papers and conclusive experiments where actual elliptic curve cryptosystems were successfully attacked and prevented. In this paper we describe electromagnetic (EM) analysis experiments(More)
There have been enormous research efforts dedicated to new countermeasures against side-channel attacks. However, very few reports were published about how to quantitatively verify their effectiveness. This paper presents statistical approaches of quantitative evaluation in respect of time disarrangement and side-channel magnitude confusion. The statistical(More)
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has become widely deployed in embedded cryptographic devices. However, power analysis attacks may retrieve secret keys by exploiting the power consumption of ECC devices. This paper proposes a countermeasure with balanced operation procedure of point doubling and addition during the scalar multiplication implementation of(More)
Simple Power Analysis (SPA), first introduced by Kocher et al. in [1], is a technique that involves directly interpreting power consumption measurements collected during cryptographic operations. Although the possibility of attacking elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) by SPA repeatedly appears in research papers, all accessible references evade the essence(More)
The scalar multiplication is the dominant operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC). It consists of a series of point additions and point doublings. A number of algorithms have been proposed to accelerate the scalar multiplication. Most of the algorithms demand high complexity which makes scalar multiplication hard to implement. In this paper, we(More)
The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is widely deployed into embedded cryptographic devices. However, straightforward implementations of ECC are prone to side-channel analysis attacks. A number of countermeasures against side-channel analysis attacks exist with different effectiveness and efficiency. How to evaluate these countermeasures with a unified and(More)
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