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Parts. A Study in Ontology
Although the relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is, this is the first full-length study of this key concept. Showing that mereology, or the formal theory of part andExpand
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Modal Logic as Metaphysics
Preface 1. Contingentism and Necessitism 2. The Barcan Formula and its Converse: Early Developments 3. Possible Worlds Model Theory 4. Predication and Modality 5. From First-Order to Higher-OrderExpand
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Knowing and Asserting
Assertions are praised as true, informative, relevant, sincere, warranted, well-phrased, or polite. They are criticized as false, uninformative, irrelevant, insincere, unwarranted, ill-phrased, orExpand
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On the psychology of vague predicates
Most speakers experience unclarity about the application of predicates like tall and red to liminal cases. We formulate alternative psychological hypotheses about the nature of this unclarity, andExpand
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Generalizing the Lottery Paradox
This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presentsExpand
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On the structure of higher-order vagueness
This paper provides a rigorous definition in a framework analogous to possible worlds semantics; it is neutral between epistemic and supervaluationist accounts of vagueness. Expand
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Knowing by Imagining
1. Imagining is often contrasted with knowing. When you know nothing about something, you have to imagine it instead. Knowledge deals in facts, imagination in fictions. This paper sketches a way ofExpand
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A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis ofExpand
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How probable is an infinite sequence of heads
Isn't probability 1 certainty? If the probability is objective, so is the certainty: whatever has chance 1 of occurring is certain to occur. Equiva lently, whatever has chance 0 of occurring isExpand
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Counterparts and Actuality
David Lewis has argued that when it comes to interpreting claims about what might or must have been, we should use the resources of his counterpart theory, not those of quantified modal logic (LewisExpand
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