Timothy C. Salmon

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The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We reexamine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter(More)
Traditional auction theory assumes that bidders possess values defined solely on the auctioned object. There may, however, be cases in which bidders possess preferences over the revenue achieved by the auctioneer. We present here a comprehensive framework of price preference valuations, unifying several phenomenon ranging from preference for charitable(More)
When conducting electronic auctions, sellers obviously wish to maximize their revenue and one tool economic theory suggests they might use is an entry fee. By charging bidders a certain amount for entering an auction, the seller can theoretically extract more surplus from those bidders that choose to enter the auction. The problem a seller faces is that the(More)
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer. — Department of Economics — University of Bonn — D-53113 Bonn, Phone: +49(0228)739220 — Fax: +49(0228)739221 * Humboldt-University of Berlin, Department of Economics, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany, Email: ivanova@wiwi.hu-berlin.de ** Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-2180,(More)