Timothy C. Salmon

Learn More
The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We reexamine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter(More)
When conducting electronic auctions, sellers obviously wish to maximize their revenue and one tool economic theory suggests they might use is an entry fee. By charging bidders a certain amount for entering an auction, the seller can theoretically extract more surplus from those bidders that choose to enter the auction. The problem a seller faces is that the(More)
Most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders …nd out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter. We examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and/or the outcome of the(More)
E¢ cient growth often requires the integration of individuals from lower-performing groups, …rms, or societies into higher-performing ones. Such integration may be di¢-cult without facilitating interventions or restrictions. We explore, using a laboratory experiment, the e¤ectiveness of two regularly-employed entry restrictions: entry quotas and entry(More)
In a procurement context, it can be quite costly for a buyer when the winning seller underestimates the cost of a project and then defaults on the project midway through completion. The Average Bid Auction is one mechanism intended to help address this problem. This format involves awarding the contract to the bidder who has bid closest to the average of(More)
  • 1