Thomas W. Polger

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In Natural Minds, Thomas Polger joins a growing number of theorists who defend the mind-brain type-identity theory while casting doubt upon orthodox non-reductive varieties of functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Polger has written a fine book in a fast-paced style that covers a lot of ground. He discusses different kinds of multiple realizability and(More)
Four different colors are needed to make maps that avoid adjacent countries of the same color. Because the retinal image is two dimensional, like a map, four dimensions of chromatic experience would also be needed to optimally distinguish regions returning spectrally different light to the eye. We therefore suggest that the organization of human color(More)
Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker argue that they do not (B&S, 1999). David Chalmers and Frank Jackson argue that they do (C&J, 2001). 1 The answer is important not least because some versions of the recently fashionable arguments against physicalism, of which(More)
Functionalism is a philosophical theory (or family of theories) concerning the nature of mental states. According to functionalism psychological/cognitive states are essentially functional states of whole systems. Functionalism characterizes psychological states essentially according to what they do, by their relations to stimulus inputs and behavioral(More)