Thomas W. Polger

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In Natural Minds, Thomas Polger joins a growing number of theorists who defend the mind-brain type-identity theory while casting doubt upon orthodox non-reductive varieties of functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Polger has written a fine book in a fast-paced style that covers a lot of ground. He discusses different kinds of multiple realizability and(More)
Four different colors are needed to make maps that avoid adjacent countries of the same color. Because the retinal image is two dimensional, like a map, four dimensions of chromatic experience would also be needed to optimally distinguish regions returning spectrally different light to the eye. We therefore suggest that the organization of human color(More)
Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker argue that they do not (B&S, 1999). David Chalmers and Frank Jackson argue that they do (C&J, 2001). 1 The answer is important not least because some versions of the recently fashionable arguments against physicalism, of which(More)
Some people believe that there is an " explanatory gap " between the facts of physics and certain other facts about the world—for example, facts about consciousness. The gap is presented as a challenge to any thoroughgoing naturalism or physicalism. We believe that advocates of the explanatory gap have some reasonable expectations that cannot be merely(More)