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This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward deviations will be more likely in one treatment than in the other. Overbidding is observed in both treatments, but is more prevalent in the treatment where the… (More)

We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs… (More)

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance $. The location of… (More)

We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The rst approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint deenes an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We this voluntary implementation , and show that the… (More)

In experimental studies of behavior in 2 × 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria, observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed-strategy Nash predictions. This paper examines experimental results for a variety of such games, and shows that a structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response… (More)

The storable votes mechanism is a voting method for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the sequence of decisions. This provides incentives for voters to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to them more, typically generating… (More)

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of monotone games with imperfect information. Players are located at the nodes of a network and observe the actions of other players only if they are connected by the network. These games have many sequential equilibria; nonetheless, the behavior of subjects in the laboratory is predictable.… (More)

We investigate a common value bilateral bargaining model with two sided private information and no aggregate uncertainty. A seller owns an asset whose common valuation is a deterministic function of the two traders'pri-vate signals. We …rst establish a no-trade theorem for this environment, and proceed to study the e¤ect of the asset valuation structure and… (More)

We analyze data from the second-price maximum-value auction experiment reported in Ivanov, Levin and Niederle (2010) in order to investigate the extent to which the winner's curse can be explained by quantal response, in combination with diffferent assumptions about equilibrium (QRE) or nonequilibrium beliefs (QCH or QCE). We find a close correspondence… (More)