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We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs(More)
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward deviations will be more likely in one treatment than in the other. Overbidding is observed in both treatments, but is more prevalent in the treatment where the(More)
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance $. The location of(More)
In experimental studies of behavior in 2 × 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria, observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed-strategy Nash predictions. This paper examines experimental results for a variety of such games, and shows that a structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response(More)
We report experimental results from long sequences of decisions in environments that are theoretically prone to severe information cascades. Observed behavior is much different—information cascades are ephemeral. We study the implications of a model based on quantal response equilibrium , in which the observed cascade formation/collapse/formation cycles(More)
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibrium we characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade, and(More)
We report an experiment using a design that permits the direct measurement of individual decision rules in voluntary contribution games. We estimate the distribution of altruism in our subjects and find that observed "overcontribution" is attributable to a combination of random variation in behavior and a few altruistic players. We also employ Andreoni's(More)
The storable votes mechanism is a voting method for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the sequence of decisions. This provides incentives for voters to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to them more, typically generating(More)