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We acknowledge support of National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology and the support of the JPL-Caltech supercomputer project. We thank Barry O'Neill, Richard Boebel, Jack Ochs and Amnon Rapoport for sharing their data. We acknowledge valuable discussions with Mahmoud El-Gamal and Mark Fey, helpful comments(More)
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward deviations will be more likely in one treatment than in the other. Overbidding is observed in both treatments, but is more prevalent in the treatment where the(More)
We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs(More)
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance $. The location of(More)
We report experimental results from long sequences of decisions in environments that are theoretically prone to severe information cascades. Observed behavior is much different—information cascades are ephemeral. We study the implications of a model based on quantal response equilibrium , in which the observed cascade formation/collapse/formation cycles(More)