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We present a formal semantical model to capture action, belief and intention, based on the " database perspective " (Shoham 2009). We then provide postulates for belief and intention revision, and state a representation theorem relating our postulates to the formal model. Our belief postulates are in the spirit of the AGM theory ; the intention postulates… (More)

A well-known open problem in epistemic logic is to give a syntactic characterization of the successful formulas. Semantically, a formula is successful if and only if for any pointed model where it is true, it remains true after deleting all points where the formula was false. The classic example of a formula that is not successful in this sense is the "… (More)

Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. The classic example is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), an extension of epistemic logic based on the idea of information acquisition as elimination of possibilities. In this paper, we address the open question of whether the set of schematic validities of… (More)

Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. A distinction therefore arises between the logic and its substitution core, the set of formulas all of whose substitution instances are valid. The classic example of a non-uniform dynamic epistemic logic is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), and a well-known… (More)

The picture of information acquisition as the elimination of possibilities has proven fruitful in many domains, serving as a foundation for formal models in philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economics. While the picture appears simple, its formalization in dynamic epistemic logic reveals subtleties: given a valid principle of information… (More)

The provability logic of a theory T is the set of modal formulas, which under any arithmetical realization are provable in T. We slightly modify this notion by requiring the arithmetical realizations to come from a specified set Γ. We make an analogous modification for interpretability logics. We first studied provability logics with restricted… (More)

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