Thomas Bolander

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This article extends and improves work on tableau-based decision methods for hybrid logic by Bolander and Braüner [5]. Their paper gives tableau-based decision procedures for basic hybrid logic (with unary modalities) and the basic logic extended with the global modality. All their proof procedures make use of loop-checks to ensure termination. Here we take(More)
In this paper, we investigate the use of event models for automated planning. Event models are the action defining structures used to define a semantics for dynamic epistemic logic. Using event models, two issues in planning can be addressed: Partial observability of the environment and knowledge. In planning, partial observability gives rise to an(More)
In this paper we show how to formalise false-belief tasks like the Sally-Anne task and the second-order chocolate task in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL). False-belief tasks are used to test the strength of the Theory of Mind (ToM) of humans, that is, a human’s ability to attribute mental states to other agents. Having a ToM is known to be essential to human(More)
This article builds on work by Bolander and Blackburn [7] on terminating tableau systems for the minimal hybrid logic K. We provide (for the basic uni-modal hybrid language) terminating tableau systems for a number of non-transitive hybrid logics extending K, such as the logic of irreflexive frames, antisymmetric frames, and so on; these systems don’t(More)
Thomas Bolander: Logical Theories for Introspective Agents Artificial intelligence systems (agents) generally have models of the environments they inhabit which they use for representing facts, for reasoning about these facts and for planning actions. Much intelligent behaviour seems to involve an ability to model not only one’s external environment but(More)
Epistemic planning is a very expressive framework that extends automated planning by the incorporation of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). We provide complexity results on the plan existence problem for multi-agent planning tasks, focusing on purely epistemic actions with propositional preconditions. We show that moving from epistemic preconditions to(More)