Theo Offerman

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Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for eliciting subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how proper scoring rules can be generalized to modern (“nonexpected utility”) theories of risk and ambiguity, yielding mutual benefits: the empirical(More)
This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot response game supports this prediction. Subjects are 67% more(More)
Auctions generally do not lead to efficient outcomes when the expected value of the object for sale depends on both private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to test three key predictions of auctions with private and common values: (i) inefficiencies grow with the uncertainty about the common value while(More)
Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infinite overlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is also the inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper investigates experimentally whether cooperation actually occurs in(More)
A substantial body of empirical literature provides evidence for overreaction in markets. Past losers outperform past winners in stock markets as well as in sports markets. Two hypotheses are consistent with this observation. First, the recency hypothesis states that traders overweigh recent information. Thus, they are too optimistic about winners and too(More)
This paper presents an experimental study of a mechanism that is commonly used to sell multiple heterogeneous goods. The novel feature of this procedure is that instead of selling each good in a separate auction, the seller executes a single auction in which buyers, who may be interested in completely different goods, compete for the right to choose a good.(More)
Several European countries and Japan are in various stages of privatizing and/or introducing more competition in passenger rail service. This process has been furthered in Europe by a directive from the Commission of the European Communities (1991) requiring member states to separate operations from infrastructure on the books and give international(More)