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One of the oldest but least understood matching problems is Gale and Shapley's (1962) " roommates problem " : is there a stable way to assign 2N students into N roommate pairs? Unlike the classic marriage problem or college admissions problem, there need not exist a stable solution to the roommates problem. However, the traditional notion of stability… (More)

Kojima and Manea (2010) present two characterizations of when an allocation rule corresponds to the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm for some substitutable priority rule of the objects being assigned. Building on their results we characterize when an allocation rule is outcome equivalent to the deferred acceptance algorithm for every… (More)

- Thayer Morrill
- EC
- 2016

Envy of another person's assignment is ``justified'' if you ``deserve'' the object and it is possible to assign you to the object. Currently, the literature only considers whether or not the agent deserves the object and ignores whether or not assigning her to it is possible. This paper defines a fair set of assignments in terms of what is possible. We… (More)

- Umut Mert, Dur, Thayer Morrill, Tayfun Sonmez, Utku Unver, Antonio Romero
- 2016

It is well known that it is impossible for a strategyproof mechanism to Pareto dominate the celebrated Deferred Acceptance algorithm (hereafter DA). However, it is unknown whether or not a mechanism can Pareto dominate DA in equilibrium when students use weakly undominated strategies. We demonstrate a surprising result. A mechanism designer can do better by… (More)

An assignment mechanism that eliminates justified envy is typically interpreted as being fair. It is well known that it is impossible for a mechanism to be strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and eliminate justified envy, but it is unknown what the strongest notion of fairness is that is achievable by a strategyproof and efficiency mechanism. We define an… (More)

My dissertation consists of two papers covering distinct topics within Microe-conomic Theory. The first chapter is drawn from Matching Theory. One of the oldest but least understood matching problems is Gale and Shapley's (1962) " roommates problem " : is there a stable way to assign 2N students into N roommate pairs? Unlike the classic marriage problem or… (More)

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