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One of the oldest but least understood matching problems is Gale and Shapley's (1962) " roommates problem " : is there a stable way to assign 2N students into N roommate pairs? Unlike the classic marriage problem or college admissions problem, there need not exist a stable solution to the roommates problem. However, the traditional notion of stability(More)
The literature on kidney exchange considers situations where two or more patients needing transplants have live donors volunteering to donate one of their kidneys, but the donated organs are incompatible with the respective patients. The traditional analysis assumes that all components of the live donor exchange must occur simultaneously. People cannot(More)
It is well known that it is impossible for a strategyproof mechanism to Pareto dominate the celebrated Deferred Acceptance algorithm (hereafter DA). However, it is unknown whether or not a mechanism can Pareto dominate DA in equilibrium when students use weakly undominated strategies. We demonstrate a surprising result. A mechanism designer can do better by(More)
Envy of another person's assignment is ``justified'' if you ``deserve'' the object and it is possible to assign you to the object. Currently, the literature only considers whether or not the agent deserves the object and ignores whether or not assigning her to it is possible. This paper defines a fair set of assignments in terms of what is possible. We(More)
My dissertation consists of two papers covering distinct topics within Microe-conomic Theory. The first chapter is drawn from Matching Theory. One of the oldest but least understood matching problems is Gale and Shapley's (1962) " roommates problem " : is there a stable way to assign 2N students into N roommate pairs? Unlike the classic marriage problem or(More)
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