Thayer Morrill

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One of the oldest but least understood matching problems is Gale and Shapley’s (1962) “roommates problem”: is there a stable way to assign 2N students into N roommate pairs? Unlike the classic marriage problem or college admissions problem, there need not exist a stable solution to the roommates problem. However, the traditional notion of stability ignores(More)
In Dur, Hammond, and Morrill (2017), we provided evidence in favor of a novel classification methodology for identifying sincere and sophisticated students in school-choice matching mechanisms. Our approach allowed us to demonstrate support for previously untested claims in the theoretical matching literature regarding the distributional consequences of(More)
An assignment mechanism that eliminates justified envy is typically interpreted as being fair. It is well known that it is impossible for a mechanism to be strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and eliminate justified envy, but it is unknown what the strongest notion of fairness is that is achievable by a strategyproof and efficiency mechanism. We define an(More)
It is well known that it is impossible for a strategyproof mechanism to Pareto dominate the celebrated Deferred Acceptance algorithm (hereafter DA). However, it is unknown whether or not a mechanism can Pareto dominate DA in equilibrium when students use weakly undominated strategies. We demonstrate a surprising result. A mechanism designer can do better by(More)
Envy of another person's assignment is ``justified'' if you ``deserve'' the object and it is possible to assign you to the object. Currently, the literature only considers whether or not the agent deserves the object and ignores whether or not assigning her to it is possible. This paper defines a fair set of assignments in terms of what is possible. We(More)