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A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and… (More)

- Tayfun Sdnmez, Tayfun Sonmez, Stephen Ching
- 2013

We search for strategy-proof solutions in the context of (many-to-one) matching problems (Gale and Shapley 1962). In this model, whenever the firms can hire as many workers as they want (the capacities are unlimited) the stable set is a singleton. There exists a Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof matching rule if and only if the… (More)

WHEN A COLLEGE GRADUATE decides to pursue a higher degree at a particular institution, one of the first challenges she faces is finding an apartment. Most institutions have on-campus housing available that is often subsidized and hence more appealing than its alternatives. Usually there are several types of on-campus housing and the attractiveness of each… (More)

We compare popular school choice mechanisms in terms of children’s access to better schools (ABS) than their catchment area school, in districts with school stratification and where priority is given for residence in the catchment area of the school. In a large market model with two good schools and one bad school, we calculate worst-case and best-case… (More)

- YAIR ANTLER, Alvin E. Roth, Ariel Rubinstein, Tayfun Sonmez, Neil Thakral
- 2014

We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents’ preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e.g. the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that result… (More)

- Tayfun Sonmez
- 2006 IEEE 14th Signal Processing and…
- 2006

The purpose of this paper is to analyze data association problem in sonar applications. Bearings only tracking algorithms are used because the range information is distorted in water. A method is proposed to associate detections with established sonar tracks using the distribution of the received signal. Using a single detection when two target's bearings… (More)

- Tayfun Sonmez, Steve Ching, +9 authors Robert A Wilson
- 2005

IN THIS PAPER WE SEARCH for solutions to various classes of allocation problems. We Ž require them to be Pareto efficient and indi idually rational in the sense that no agent is . ever worse off than he would be on his own . In addition to these minimal requirements we also would like agents not to be able to profitably misrepresent their preferences. This… (More)

- Tayfun Sdnmez, Tayfun Sonmez, Alvin E. Roth, James Schummer, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Koichi Tade
- 2013

We introduce and study the class of generalized matching problems. Two subclasses of this class are marriage problems (Gale and Shapley 1962) and the housing market (Shapley and Scarf 1974). We search for strategy-proof solutions to generalized matching problems. We show that if the core is a singleton and is stable for all problems then it is… (More)

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