Tayfun Sonmez

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WHEN A COLLEGE GRADUATE decides to pursue a higher degree at a particular institution, one of the first challenges she faces is finding an apartment. Most institutions have on-campus housing available that is often subsidized and hence more appealing than its alternatives. Usually there are several types of on-campus housing and the attractiveness of each(More)
We compare popular school choice mechanisms in terms of children’s access to better schools (ABS) than their catchment area school, in districts with school stratification and where priority is given for residence in the catchment area of the school. In a large market model with two good schools and one bad school, we calculate worst-case and best-case(More)
We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents’ preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e.g. the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that result(More)
The purpose of this paper is to analyze data association problem in sonar applications. Bearings only tracking algorithms are used because the range information is distorted in water. A method is proposed to associate detections with established sonar tracks using the distribution of the received signal. Using a single detection when two target's bearings(More)
IN THIS PAPER WE SEARCH for solutions to various classes of allocation problems. We Ž require them to be Pareto efficient and indi idually rational in the sense that no agent is . ever worse off than he would be on his own . In addition to these minimal requirements we also would like agents not to be able to profitably misrepresent their preferences. This(More)
We introduce and study the class of generalized matching problems. Two subclasses of this class are marriage problems (Gale and Shapley 1962) and the housing market (Shapley and Scarf 1974). We search for strategy-proof solutions to generalized matching problems. We show that if the core is a singleton and is stable for all problems then it is(More)
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