Tatsuyoshi Saijo

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1 ABSTRACT Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double(More)
  • Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara, Antonio Cabrales, Giulio Codognato, Ahmed Doghmi, Navin Kartik +6 others
  • 2011
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially-honest(More)
This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. It yields(More)
† We thank anonymous referees and an associate editor for their useful comments. 2 ABSTRACT Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash(More)
This paper studies voluntary public good provision in the laboratory, in a cross-cultural experiment conducted in the United States and Japan. Our environment differs from the standard voluntary contribution mechanism because subjects first decide whether or not to participate in providing this non-excludable public good. This participation decision is(More)
What rule is fair? This experimental study considers equality and equity (i.e., allocations that are proportional to individual contributions). Impersonal third parties, or spectators, favor equity. Distributive preferences move progressively toward equality, however, with the introduction of personal factors, such as sharing stakes with another (i.e.,(More)
We present a new family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions the new family of mechanisms are super-modular games, which implies that they converge under a wide class of learning dynamics, including Bayesian learning, adaptive learning, ctitious play and many others. Among the existing(More)
Suzuki, two anonymous referees, and Economic Science Association conference participants for their helpful comments and discussions. Abstract We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the(More)