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We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that… (More)

I analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a renewable surplus is divided among n ≥ 5 committee members in each of an infinite number of periods, and the division implemented in one period becomes the status quo allocation of the surplus in the ensuing period. I establish existence of equilibrium exhibiting minimum winning coalitions, assuming… (More)

We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis (2008). We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the model, and we show that the collocation equations are locally Lipchitz continuous and directionally differentiable. In numerical… (More)

We specify and compute equilibria of a dynamic policy-making game between a president and a legislature under insitutional rules that emulate those of the US Constitution. Policies are assumed to lie in a two-dimensional space in which one issue dimension captures systemic differences in partisan preferences, while the other summarizes non-partisan… (More)

We analyze a class of two-candidate voter participation games under complete information that encompasses as special cases certain public good provision games. We characterize the Nash equilibria of these games as stationary points of a non-linear programming problem, the objective function of which is a Morse function (one that does not admit degenerate… (More)

Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities , and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. The approach recovers Eraslan's (2002) uniqueness result and… (More)

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