Tasos Kalandrakis

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We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis (2008). We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the model, and we show that the collocation equations are locally Lipchitz continuous and directionally differentiable. In numerical(More)
We specify and compute equilibria of a dynamic policy-making game between a president and a legislature under insitutional rules that emulate those of the US Constitution. Policies are assumed to lie in a two-dimensional space in which one issue dimension captures systemic differences in partisan preferences, while the other summarizes non-partisan(More)
Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities , and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. The approach recovers Eraslan's (2002) uniqueness result and(More)
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