Tasos Kalandrakis

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This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense(More)
We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that(More)
In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players' voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal-making rule such that this division(More)
Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? Do legislative deadlocks occur when presidents do not form majoritarian governments? Are presidential democracies more brittle when they are ruled by minorities? We answer these questions observing almost all democracies that existed between 1946 and 1999. It turns out(More)
This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise — a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period's state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoff-irrelevant public randomization device, delivering known results on existence of(More)
I analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a renewable surplus is divided among n ≥ 5 committee members in each of an infinite number of periods, and the division implemented in one period becomes the status quo allocation of the surplus in the ensuing period. I establish existence of equilibrium exhibiting minimum winning coalitions, assuming(More)
For a class of n-player (n ≥ 2) sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition and general agreement rules, we characterize pure strategy Stationary Subgame Perfect (PSSP) equilibria via a finite number of equalities and inequalities. We use this characterization and the degree theory of Shannon, 1994, to show that when utility over agreements(More)
We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis (2008). We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the model, and we show that the collocation equations are locally Lipchitz continuous and directionally differentiable. In numerical(More)