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- Marco Battaglini, Stephen Coate, +9 authors Tom Romer
- 2005

This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense… (More)

- John Duggan, Tasos Kalandrakis
- J. Economic Theory
- 2012

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that… (More)

In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players' voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal-making rule such that this division… (More)

This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise — a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period's state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoff-irrelevant public randomization device, delivering known results on existence of… (More)

- Tasos Kalandrakis
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2010

I analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a renewable surplus is divided among n ≥ 5 committee members in each of an infinite number of periods, and the division implemented in one period becomes the status quo allocation of the surplus in the ensuing period. I establish existence of equilibrium exhibiting minimum winning coalitions, assuming… (More)

For a class of n-player (n ≥ 2) sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition and general agreement rules, we characterize pure strategy Stationary Subgame Perfect (PSSP) equilibria via a finite number of equalities and inequalities. We use this characterization and the degree theory of Shannon, 1994, to show that when utility over agreements… (More)

- John Duggan, Tasos Kalandrakis
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2011

We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis (2008). We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the model, and we show that the collocation equations are locally Lipchitz continuous and directionally differentiable. In numerical… (More)

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative bargaining in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that… (More)

We analyze the legislative interaction of representatives from big and small states in a Bicameral legislature that decides for the allocation of a fixed resource among the states. We assume that the two houses are mal-apportioned and big states are under-represented in the upper house. We study the effect of this and other institutional features on the… (More)

- Kosuke Imai, Teppei Yamamoto, +6 authors Jas Sekhon
- 2008

Political scientists have long been concerned about the validity of survey measurements. Although many have studied classical measurement error in linear regression models where the error is assumed to arise completely at random, in a number of situations the error may be correlated with the outcome. We analyze the impact of differential measurement error… (More)