Tasos Kalandrakis

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We specify and compute equilibria of a dynamic policy-making game between a president and a legislature under insitutional rules that emulate those of the US Constitution. Policies are assumed to lie in a two-dimensional space in which one issue dimension captures systemic differences in partisan preferences, while the other summarizes non-partisan(More)
along with various seminar and conference participants for helpful comments and stimulating conversations. Any errors are our own. Abstract We analyze a legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive issue. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological positions. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and(More)
Conference on Game Theory. We are also grateful to Martin Osborne (the editor) and three anonymous referees for very helpful and detailed comments and suggestions. Any errors are our own. Abstract We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their their(More)
We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis (2008). We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the model, and we show that the collocation equations are locally Lipchitz continuous and directionally differentiable. In numerical(More)
Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities , and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. The approach recovers Eraslan's (2002) uniqueness result and(More)
Pareto dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game with endogenous status-quo. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preferences that satisfy the single-plateau property. It is also shown that there does not(More)
Objective. This course is designed primarily as a graduate seminar in comparative politics. Its object is to introduce the participants to the comparative study of democratic political processes. The course meets preparation requirements for this substantive subfield of the Ph.D. comprehensive examination in comparative politics. No background in(More)
  • Jim Snyder, Jordi Blanes I Vidal, Catherine De Vries, Alexander Fouirnaies, Simon Hix, Torun Dewan +4 others
  • 2013
Why do voters support corrupt politicians? One reason is that voters care about both corruption and partisan control of government; the more voters care about which party wins, the less they can deter individual wrongdoing. I highlight this tradeoff in the 2009 UK expenses scandal, showing that electoral accountability was less effective in constituencies(More)