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In addition to their common use for private online communication, anonymous communication networks can also be used to circumvent censorship. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which they are actually used for this purpose without violating the privacy of the networks' users. Knowing this extent can be useful to designers and researchers(More)
Tor is the most popular low-latency anonymity overlay network for the Internet, protecting the privacy of hundreds of thousands of people every day. To ensure a high level of security against certain attacks, Tor currently utilizes special nodes called <i>entry guards</i> as each client's long-term entry point into the anonymity network. While the use of(More)
Tor is the most popular low-latency anonymity network for enhancing ordinary users' online privacy and resisting censorship. While it has grown in popularity, Tor has a variety of performance problems that result in poor quality of service, a strong disincentive to use the system, and weaker anonymity properties for all users. We observe that one reason why(More)
Tor is the most popular low-latency anonymity network for enhancing ordinary users' online privacy and resisting censorship. While it has grown in popularity, Tor has a variety of performance problems that result in poor quality of service, a strong disincentive to use the system , and weaker anonymity properties for all users. We observe that one reason(More)
This paper argues that one of the most important decisions in designing and deploying censorship resistance systems is whether one set of system options should be selected (the best), or whether there should be several sets of good ones. We model the problem of choosing these options as a cat-and-mouse game and show that the best strategy depends on the(More)
The Internet censorship conflict is like a game of cat-and-mouse, in which the censor discovers and acts on distinguishers that set the usage of censorship resistance systems (CRSs) apart from other Internet usage, and the CRSs’ attempts to remove and mitigate these distinguishers. Our systematization is based on a simple and intuitive model of the(More)
An increasing number of countries implement Internet censorship at different scales and for a variety of reasons. Several censorship resistance systems (CRSs) have emerged to help bypass such blocks. The diversity of the cen-sor's attack landscape has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of CRSs. The inherent complexity of CRSs and(More)
This extended abstract presents our vision of PrivEy, a distributed data collection and anomaly detection framework for the Tor network. PrivEy builds on the general framework of PrivEx (CCS 2014), a system for privately collecting statistics about traffic egressing the Tor network; however, PrivEy extends PrivEx in several important respects: (i) it(More)