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This paper addresses privacy leakage in biometric secrecy systems. Four settings are investigated. The first one is the standard Ahlswede-Csiszar secret-generation setting in which two terminals observe two correlated sequences. They form a common secret by interchanging a public message. This message should only contain a negligible amount of information(More)
We propose methods to estimate the secrecy-rate of fuzzy sources (e.g. biometrics and physical unclonable functions (PUFs)) using context-tree weighting. In this paper we focus on PUFs. In order to show that our estimates are realistic we first generalize Maurer's (1993) result to the ergodic case. Then we focus on the fact that the entropy of a stationary(More)
Motivated by Maurer [1993], Ahlswede and Csiszar [1993] introduced the concept of secret sharing. In their source model two terminals observe two correlated sequences. It is the objective of both terminals to form a common secret by interchanging a public message (helper data), that should contain only a negligible amount of information about the secret.(More)
In this paper we analyze secret generation in biometric identification systems with protected templates. This problem is closely related to the study of the biometric identification capacity of Willems et al. 2003 and O'Sullivan and Schmid 2002 and the common randomness generation of Ahlswede and Csiszár 1993. In our system two terminals observe(More)
In 1999, Juels and Wattenberg introduced the fuzzy commitment scheme. This scheme is a particular realization of a binary biometric secrecy system with chosen secret keys. It became a popular technique for designing biometric secrecy systems, since it is convenient and easy to implement using standard error-correcting codes. This paper investigates privacy-(More)
We focus here on two secure biometric systems (a common randomness based scheme and a fuzzy commitment scheme) and discuss their privacy preserving properties. We derive bounds on the privacy leakage in these schemes. We also show the relation between employed error-correction and leakage on biometric information, and between privacy and security for the(More)
We present models for authentication in biometric settings. We could determine the trade-off between false-acceptance exponents and the so-called privacy-leakage rate. In this way we extend the Ahlswede-Csiszar secret-key generation result [1993] and more specifically the secret-key rate vs. privacy-leakage rate trade-off, studied by Ignatenko and Willems(More)
In the system that we investigate here, two terminals observe the enrollment and identification biometric sequences of different individuals. The first terminal binds a secret key to each enrolled individual and stores the corresponding helper data in a public database. These helper data, on one hand, facilitate reliable determination of the individual's(More)
The fundamental secret-key rate vs. privacy-leakage rate trade-offs for secret-key generation and transmission for i.i.d. Gaussian biometric sources are determined. These results are the Gaussian equivalents of the results that were obtained for the discrete case by the authors and independently by Lai et al. in 2008. Also the effect that binary(More)