Talat S. Genc

Learn More
We study dynamic duopolistic competition between hydro and thermal generators under demand uncertainty. Producers compete in quantities and each is constrained: the thermal generator by capacity and the hydro generator by water availability. Two versions of the model are analysed: an infinite-horizon game emphasizing water withholding incentives of the(More)
This paper studies market outcome equivalence of two dynamic productioncapital investment games under uncertainty. One is played under complete information, while the other, feedback (FB) game, is played under incomplete information about the opponents’ costs and market demand. The FB game structure may be observed in some newly initiated industries, in(More)
We analyze collusion in two comparable market structures. In the first market structure only one firm is vertically integrated; there is one more independent firm in the upstream industry and another independent firm in the downstream industry. In the second market structure, there are only two vertically integrated firms that can trade among themselves in(More)
  • 1