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Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan
A distinction is proposed betweentrust as a cognitive bias in the evaluation of incomplete information about the (potential) interaction partner andassurance as a perception of the incentive
The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the structural determinants of power in exchange networks, along with research findings from laboratory experiments and a computer simulation of
Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan1
A theory of trust proposed by Yamagishi and Yamagishi provides the basis for the prediction that (1) social uncertainty promotes commitment formation between particular partners and (2) high trusters
The Group as the Container of Generalized Reciprocity
The results of an experiment with 91 Japanese participants confirmed the hypothesis that players of a Prisoner's Dilemma game would cooperate more with an in-group member than with an out-group
Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas
In generalized exchange, the rewards that an actor receives usually are not directly contingent on the resources provided by that actor; therefore free riding can occur. The actor can receive benefit
The provision of a sanctioning system in the United States and Japan
Yamagishi's (1986a) experiment, which tested hypotheses derived from the structural goal/expectation approach to the problem of social dilemmas, was replicated using North American subjects. The
Trust, Gullibility, and Social Intelligence
A series of experiments conducted in Japan by Yamagishi and his associates are presented, all consistently showing that high trusters (as measured with a general trust scale) are more sensitive than