• Publications
  • Influence
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
  • T. Sandholm
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Artif. Intell.
  • 1 February 2002
We present a search algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions by exploiting the fact that the space of bids is sparsely populated. Expand
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Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees
We present an algorithm that establishes a tight bound within this minimal amount of search, and show that any other algorithm would have to search strictly more. Expand
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Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. Expand
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Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges
In barter-exchange markets, agents seek to swap their items with one another, in order to improve their own utilities. These swaps consist of cycles of agents, with each agent receiving the item ofExpand
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An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations
This paper presents a formalization of the bidding and awarding process that was left undefined in the original contract net task allocation protocol. Expand
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When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Expand
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Distributed rational decision making
Automated negotiation systems with self interested agents are becoming increas ingly important One reason for this is the technology push of a growing standardized communication infrastructure Internet WWW NII EDI KQML FIPA Concor dia Voyager Odyssey Telescript Java etc over which separately designed agents belonging to di erent organizations can interact in an open environment in real time. Expand
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Contract Types for Satisficing Task Allocation:I Theoretical Results
We analyze task reallocation where individually rational ([R) agents (re)contract tasks among themselves based on marginal costs. A task allocation graph is introduced as a tool for analyzingExpand
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An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, i.e. auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auctions in multi-item auctions where the agents' valuations of the items are not additive. Expand
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AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents
We present AWESOME, the first multiagent learning algorithm that is guaranteed to have both of the properties in games with arbitrary numbers of actions and players. Expand
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