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- Tamer BAAR
- 1987

The equilibrium solution of a zero-sum or a non-zero-sum game is said to be stable if, after any deviation from that equilibrium, an adjustment process that involves unilateral optimal responses by the players can bring it back to the starting point. One appealing feature of a stable equilibrium is that in the on-line adjustment process the players need to… (More)

- Tamer BAAR, Alain HAURIE, Gianni RlCCI
- 1985

This paper deals with a modified version of the Lancaster model of capitalism, where it is assumed that there is a cost jointly borne by the two groups of players (workers versus capitalists) and associated with the bargaining of a larger share of consumption for the workers. It is shown that a Feedback-Stackelberg solution, with the capitalists acting as… (More)

- T. Baar
- L'OBJET
- 2003

Although modeling languages as the UML (Unified Modeling Language) are primarily used in the context of software development, other application scenarios exist. A prominent example is the definition of languages; e.g. UML is partly defined in terms of UML. This technique of metamodeling became popular and has many advantages, but metacircularity is one of… (More)

In this study we introduce a general definition of an equilibrium concept (called "strong equilibrium") for both discrete-and continuous-time dynamic games and under varying (symmetrical and asymmetrical) modes of play. The underlying Pystem is stochastic, with structural and modal uncertainties determined by a finite state jump process. The new… (More)

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