Sydney Shoemaker

Learn More
The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This(More)
What is the role of consciousness in our introspective lives? In this paper, I will focus on the role of conscious judgment in giving us access to our standing non-conscious beliefs. The view I will defend is a special case of a more general position in the epistemology of introspection. I will start by sketching the general view, and then give the details(More)
These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes(More)
It is widely held that a mental state and the subject's introspective belief about it are always 'distinct existences' and only contingently connected. This suggests that for each sort of mental state there could be a creature that is introspectively 'blind' with respect to states of that sort, meaning that while it is capable of having such states, and of(More)
Neo-Cartesian approaches to belief place greater evidential weight on a subject’s introspective judgments than do neo-behaviorist accounts. As a result, the two views differ on whether our absent-minded and weak-willed actions are guided by belief. I argue that simulationist accounts of the concept of belief are committed to neo-Cartesianism, and, though(More)
  • 1