Sydney Shoemaker

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These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes(More)
It has been said that the history of western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato. Whatever truth there may be in this, there is surely much more truth in the claim that the history of the topic of personal identity has been a series of footnotes to Locke. There are two major strands to that history. One is a series of accounts of personal identity(More)
I am grateful to Michael Tyc for his discussion of my book, and to thc cditor for offering me thc opportunity to respond to Tyc's criticisms of my account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience-especially sincc this prompted reflections that lcd mc to scc a way of removing onc unattractive feature of the account. Thc view Tye criticizes in his(More)
Introduction What is the role of consciousness in our introspective lives? In this paper, I will focus on the role of conscious judgment in giving us access to our standing non-conscious beliefs. The view I will defend is a special case of a more general position in the epistemology of introspection. I will start by sketching the general view, and then give(More)
Neo-Cartesian approaches to belief place greater evidential weight on a subject's introspective judgments than do neo-behaviorist accounts. As a result, the two views differ on whether our absent-minded and weak-willed actions are guided by belief. I argue that simulationist accounts of the concept of belief are committed to neo-Cartesianism, and, though(More)
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