Susumu Shikano

Learn More
We investigate whether the theory of strategic voting can explain voting behavior in a fairly common type of political system, multi-party systems with proportional representation, minimum vote thresholds, and coalition governments. In this paper, we develop a formal (computational) strategic voting game and show in a simulation that the model produces(More)
*We are grateful to many people who have helped us locate, collect, or code the data and who have provided thoughtful comments on previous versions of the paper. In particular, we would like to thank the participants in Harvard's Political Psychology and Behavior workshop, and the three anonymous referees. All errors and omissions are our responsibility.(More)
This paper aims to deliver experimental evidence on the dispute between two behavioral models of electoral turnout (Bendor, Diermeier & Ting, APSR 2003; Fowler,JoP 2006). Both models share the idea that the subjects' voting propensities are updated from their past propensities, aspirations and realized payo s. However, they di er in the exact speci cation(More)
The proliferation of new parties since the 1960’s poses a challenge to established models of party behavior: too often, too many parties lose in elections. This seemingly nonstrategic behavior contributes to lively democratic societies, but is poorly understood by existing theories on political parties. This dissertation argues that insights from(More)
In Nomina Anatomica 6th ed., the articular facets for the rib on the thoracic vertebra are called Fovea costalis superior, Fovea costalis inferior, and Fovea costalis processus transversi respectively. But, there is a little problem about the names of Fovea costalis superior and Fovea costalis inferior on the body of vertebra, because usually only one facet(More)