Sunil Dutta

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This paper develops a multiperiod agency model to study the use of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake " soft " investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on(More)
This paper examines the choice of asset valuation rules from a managerial control perspective. A manager creates value for a rm through his eeort choices. To support its operating activities, the rm also engages in nancing activities such as credit sales to its customers. Since such nancing activities merely change the pattern of cash ows across periods, an(More)
  • H A R E S H S A P R A, Rick Antle, Ulf Axelson, Doug Diamond, Sunil Dutta, Thomas Hemmer +6 others
  • 2000
In order to shed some light on the desirability of hedge disclosures, I investigate the consequences of hedge disclosures on a firm's risk management strategy. Several major results emerge from this analysis. First, greater transparency about a firm's derivative activities is not necessarily a panacea for imprudent risk management strategies. I show that(More)
  • Sunil Dutta, Xiao-Jun Zhang, Chandra Kanodia, Arijit Mukherji, Jim Ohlson, Stefan Reichelstein +1 other
  • 2001
anonymous referee and seminar participants at University of Minnesota for their comments and suggestions. Abstract This paper examines how various revenue recognition rules affect the incentive properties of accounting information in a stewardship setting. Our analysis demonstrates that if revenues are recognized according to the realization principle, a(More)
This paper characterizes optimal pay-performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for managers who have private information about their skills, and those skills affect their outside employment opportunities. The model presumes that the rate at which a man-ager's opportunity wage increases in his expertise depends on the nature of that expertise,(More)
  • Sunil Dutta, Stefan Reichelstein, Jerry Feltham, Dirk Hackbarth, Steve Huddart, Jim Ohlson
  • 2004
Bill Rogerson and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments and suggestions. Abstract This paper develops a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a manager must be given incentives to undertake investments and to exert personally costly effort. Investments are " soft " (e.g., intangible assets) and therefore entail measurement errors for the(More)
This paper was previously titled " Optimists, Pessimists, and Managerial Disclosures. " We would like to thank Nahum Melumad, Robert Verrecchia, and the participants of workshops at UCLA and Wharton for their useful comments. All remaining errors are, of course, our own. ABSTRACT This paper explores a setting in which analysts and other investors in the(More)
  • Sunil Dutta, Stefan Reichelstein, Carnegie Mellon, Lmu Munich, London, Bob Kaplan +2 others
  • 2009
and the Indian School of Business for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, titled " Decentralized Capacity Management " We are particularly indebted to This paper studies the acquisition and subsequent utilization of production capacity in a multi-divisional firm. In a setting where an upstream division provides capacity for itself and a(More)
  • Yaniv Konchitchki, Panos N Patatoukas, Severin Borenstein, Sunil Dutta, Reut Laufer, Topseht Nonam +3 others
  • 2014
In this study, we hypothesize and find that financial statement analysis of firm profitability drivers applied at the aggregate level yields timely insights that are relevant for forecasting real economic activity. We first show that focusing on the 100 largest firms offers a cost-effective way to extract information embedded in accounting profitability(More)