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This paper characterizes optimal pay-performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for managers who have private information about their skills, and those skills affect their outside employment opportunities. The model presumes that the rate at which a manager’s opportunity wage increases in his expertise depends on the nature of that expertise, i.e.,(More)
This paper examines the choice of asset valuation rules from a managerial control perspective. A manager creates value for a rm through his e ort choices. To support its operating activities, the rm also engages in nancing activities such as credit sales to its customers. Since such nancing activities merely change the pattern of cash ows across periods, an(More)
This paper examines how various revenue recognition rules affect the incentive properties of accounting information in a stewardship setting. Our analysis demonstrates that if revenues are recognized according to the realization principle, a single performance measure based on aggregated accounting information can be used to provide desirable production and(More)
Using a financial reporting and valuation model, we investigate the construct validity of Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness (AT) regression coefficient as a measure of asymmetrically timely loss recognition or “conditional conservatism” in corporate financial reporting. Within the context of our model, we predict that the AT coefficient will be positive(More)
In order to shed some light on the desirability of hedge disclosures, I investigate the consequences of hedge disclosures on a firm’s risk management strategy. Several major results emerge from this analysis. First, greater transparency about a firm’s derivative activities is not necessarily a panacea for imprudent risk management strategies. I show that(More)
This paper demonstrates that conservative aggregation in accounting often improves the overall quality of information produced, and therefore enhances the welfare of accounting information users. We study the optimal accounting policy when a …rm can control the quality of accounting information through costly and noncontractible action. In our model, the(More)
We formulate and analyze a model of team structure and monitoring within a Linear-Exponential-Normal (LEN) agency framework. We incorporate three key instruments in the internal design of an organization involving team production: team size, monitoring activities, and incentive contracts. We show that the complex tradeoffs among these instruments lead to(More)
This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, how earnings management and ownership retention interact, and how these two jointly affect the equilibrium market valuation of IPO firms in the presence of information asymmetry. Analytically, this paper extends the univariate signaling framework of Leland and Pyle (1977) and derives an efficient(More)