Sunil Dutta

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anonymous referee and seminar participants at University of Minnesota for their comments and suggestions. Abstract This paper examines how various revenue recognition rules affect the incentive properties of accounting information in a stewardship setting. Our analysis demonstrates that if revenues are recognized according to the realization principle, a(More)
  • Rick Antle, Ulf Axelson, +5 authors H. SAPRA
  • 2000
In order to shed some light on the desirability of hedge disclosures, I investigate the consequences of hedge disclosures on a firm's risk management strategy. Several major results emerge from this analysis. First, greater transparency about a firm's derivative activities is not necessarily a panacea for imprudent risk management strategies. I show that(More)
This paper develops a multiperiod agency model to study the use of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake " soft " investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on(More)
* I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the associate editor for many useful comments. I have also benefited from the remarks of Abstract This paper characterizes optimal pay-performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for managers who have private information about their skills, and those skills affect their outside employment(More)
Bill Rogerson and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments and suggestions. Abstract This paper develops a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a manager must be given incentives to undertake investments and to exert personally costly effort. Investments are " soft " (e.g., intangible assets) and therefore entail measurement errors for the(More)
This paper demonstrates that conservative aggregation in accounting often improves the overall quality of information produced, and therefore enhances the welfare of accounting information users. We study the optimal accounting policy when a …rm can control the quality of accounting information through costly and noncontractible action. In our model, the(More)