Sung-Ha Hwang

Learn More
Contest success functions, which show how probabilities of winning depend on resources devoted to a con‡ict, have been widely used in the literature addressing appropriative activities (economics), international and civil wars (political science), and group con‡ict and selection (evolutionary biology). Two well-known forms of contest success functions(More)
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals playing a game with their neighbors in a spatial domain and describe the time evolution of strategy profile of individuals over space. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations of strategy revision stochastic processes. These equations generalize the existing ordinary differential(More)
SPATIAL EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY: DETERMINISTIC APPROXIMATIONS, DECOMPOSITIONS, AND HIERARCHICAL MULTI-SCALE MODELS SEPTEMBER 2011 SUNGHA HWANG, B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Luc Rey-Bellet Evolutionary game theory has recently emerged as a key paradigm in(More)
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and(More)
This paper shows how larger group size can enhance punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence support higher levels of cooperation. We focus on describing con‡ict technology using Lanchester’s equations and study the role of “collectivity”of punishment to support cooperation in large groups. The main results suggest that as long as defectors are, even(More)
Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good government of an altruistic citizenry that values the well being of one another. Others have emphasized the need for incentives that induce even the self interested to contribute to the public good. Implicitly most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at(More)
We address two seemingly unrelated empirical anomalies: the remarkable historical persistence of cultural and institutional differences affecting production and distribution even among nations and regions engaged in extensive trading, and the shortcomings of the standard model that predicts international specialization and trade on the basis of differences(More)
We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are “strategically equivalent” if, for every player, the payoff differences between two strategies (holding other players’ strategies fixed) are identical. A(More)