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Available online xxx JEL classification: C72 C92 H41 Keywords: Public good Experiment Punishment Strong reciprocity Team production a b s t r a c t Punishment of shirkers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems and sustaining coordination in work teams. Explanations of the motivation to punish generally rely either on small group size(More)
Contest success functions, which show how probabilities of winning depend on resources devoted to a con ‡ict, have been widely used in the literature addressing appropriative activities (economics), international and civil wars (political science), and group con ‡ict and selection (evolutionary biology). Two well-known forms of contest success functions(More)
We introduce several methods of decomposition for two player normal form games. Viewing the set of all games as a vector space, we exhibit explicit orthonormal bases for the subspaces of potential games, zero-sum games, and their orthogonal complements which we call anti-potential games and anti-zero-sum games, respectively. Perhaps surprisingly, every(More)
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and(More)
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals playing a game with their neighbors in a spatial domain and describe the time evolution of strategy profile of individuals over space. We derive integro-differential equations as determin-istic approximations of strategy revision stochastic processes. These equations generalize the existing ordinary differential(More)
This paper shows how larger group size can enhance punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence support higher levels of cooperation. We focus on describing con ‡ict technology using Lanchester's equations and study the role of " collectivity " of punishment to support cooperation in large groups. The main results suggest that as long as defectors are,(More)
We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game—a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game. We present a unified framework applicable for both potential and zero-sum equivalent(More)
The objective of the present study was to establish the method of measurement of hydrogen peroxide and to estimate the anti-oxidative effect of genistein in the skin. UVB induced skin oxidation and anti-oxidative effect of genistein formulations were evaluated by determining levels of hydrogen peroxide. The mechanism involved in the determination of(More)
We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are " strategically equivalent " if, for every player, the payoff differences between two strategies (holding other players' strategies fixed) are identical. A(More)
Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good government of an altruistic citizenry that values the well being of one another. Others have emphasized the need for incentives that induce even the self interested to contribute to the public good. Implicitly most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at(More)