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This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are nonincreasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be strategic complements. The main result here is that the equilibrium set… (More)

Under some conditions, parameterized games with strategic substitutes exhibit monotone comparative statics of equilibria. These conditions relate to a tradeoff between a direct parameter effect and an opposing, indirect strategic substitute effect. If the indirect effect does not dominate the direct effect, monotone comparative statics of equilibria are… (More)

- Abhijit Chandra, Sunanda Roy
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2013

Condorcet profiles are responsible for a number of well known preference aggregation paradoxes. It is reasonable to claim that these profiles represent complete ties between the candidates and should therefore be excluded to determine election outcomes. Established profile decomposition techniques are of limited usefulness in extracting and removing… (More)

- Sunanda Roy, Tarun Sabarwal
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2012

In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability can be analyzed using a single best response dynamic. Moreover,… (More)

Recent developments in voting theory show that Condorcet profiles embedded in electorates are responsible for conflicts between pairwise voting methods and for reversals of rankings under positional methods whenever candidates are dropped or added. Because of the strong symmetry of the rankings of the candidates within these profiles, it can be argued that… (More)

- Sunanda Roy, Tarun Sabarwal
- BQGT
- 2010

New insights into the theory of games with strategic substitutes (GSS) are developed. These games possess extremal serially undominated strategies that provide bounds on predicted behavior and on limiting behavior of adaptive dynamics, similar to games with strategic complements (GSC). In parameterized GSS, monotone equilibrium selections are dynamically… (More)

- Sunanda Roy
- 2015

A game of incomplete information or a Bayesian game is a game in which players do not have full information about each others payoffs. In a strategic situation where a player’s payoff depends on what actions his rivals will take, this poses a problem because a player does not know which game is being played. There are several reasons why players may not… (More)

- Sunanda Roy
- 2015

1.1 Definitions The individual strategy set Ai is finite with mi elements, {ai . . .a mi i }, indexed a ki i . A mixed strategy for player i, αi is a probability distribution over Ai, with αi(ai i ) as the probability of choosing a ki i . Thus ∑i ki=1 αi(a ki i ) = 1. The space of all mixed strategies for player i is denoted ∆Ai. Let a ∈ A = (a1 1 ,a k2 2 ,… (More)

- Sunanda Roy
- 2015

MSNE assumes players use a random device privately and independently, that tells them which strategy to choose for any given play. The Bayesian environment, we have discussed so far assumes that signals are random, private and independent. The question that we address here is what happens if the signals are random but public (not private) and not… (More)

- Sunanda Roy
- 1999

Labor contracts are a way of sharing idiosyncratic production risks between entrepreneurs and workers, especially when such risks are too complex for contingent contracts to be written on them. So it is important to understand how equilibrium employment and wages are affected by risk related factors, such as risk aversion of entrepreneurs and workers, risk… (More)