Sunanda Roy

Learn More
In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability can be analyzed using a single best response dynamic. Moreover,(More)
Condorcet profiles are responsible for a number of well known preference aggregation paradoxes. It is reasonable to claim that these profiles represent complete ties between the candidates and should therefore be excluded to determine election outcomes. Established profile decomposition techniques are of limited usefulness in extracting and removing(More)
Recent developments in voting theory show that Condorcet profiles embedded in electorates are responsible for distortions in pairwise election tallies of any pair of candidates from a given set. Such distortions are the sole cause of conflicts between the various pairwise voting methods and of reversals of rankings, when candidates are dropped from or added(More)
New insights into the theory of games with strategic substitutes (GSS) are developed. These games possess extremal serially undominated strategies that provide bounds on predicted behavior and on limiting behavior of adaptive dynamics, similar to games with strategic complements (GSC). In parameterized GSS, monotone equilibrium selections are dynamically(More)
  • 1