Stuart Gilson

Learn More
  • Belén Villalonga, Raphael Amit, Carliss Baldwin, Lucien Bebchuk, Wilbur Chung, Harold Demsetz +25 others
  • 2004
Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that(More)
  • Belén Villalonga, Raphael Amit, Manuel Campa, Gary Dushnitsky, Mara Faccio, Stuart Gilson +13 others
  • 2009
In large U.S. corporations, founding families are the only blockholders whose control rights on average exceed their cash-flow rights. We analyze how they achieve this wedge, and at what cost. Indirect ownership through trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, and other corporations is prevalent but rarely creates a wedge (a pyramid). The primary sources(More)
  • 1